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HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AS THE
FORUM OF LAST RESORT: AN IDEA WHOSE
TIME HAS NOT COME
ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON*
Hospital Ethics Committees have become a fixture in American
medicine and are poised to become the forum of last resort for
end-of-life decisions as a result of state statutes giving committees
immunity and privilege. The effect of such legislation is to
transform ethics committees from an adjunct to the courts into a
substitute for them, without giving patients any of the process
protections attendant to judicial decisionmaking. In this Article,
Robin Fretwell Wilson provides a critical comparison of ethics
committees to courts and concludes that contrary to the
conventional wisdom of the ethics committee movement, it is
unclear that hospital ethics committees are innately better suited to
make end-of-life decisions than state and federal courts.
I. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF THE ETHICS
COMMITTEE MOVEMENT: COMMITrEES ARE
BETTER FORUMS FOR RESOLUTION OF
ETHICAL ISSUES THAN COURTS .................................................. 367
II. EXAMINING THE UNDERLYING PREMISE:
COURTS AS DECISiONMAKERS .................................................... 370
A. The Courts' Expertise .............................................................. 370
* Associate, Mayor, Day, Caldwell & Keeton, L.L.P., Houston, Texas; Adjunct
Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Houston, Texas; J.D., University of
Virginia School of Law, 1995; B.A., University of Virginia, 1989; former member of the
Virginia Bioethics Network and the Richmond (Virginia) Bioethics Consortium. Thanks
to Professor John C. Fletcher of the University of Virginia School of Medicine; Professors
Douglas Leslie, Paul Lombardo, John Monahan, and Walter Wadlington of the
University of Virginia School of Law; Professors Mark Rothstein and William Winslade
of the University of Houston Law Center; Professor Philip G. Peters, Jr., University of
Missouri - Columbia School of Law; Professor Todd Zywicki of the Mississippi College
School of Law; Professor Bethany Spielman of the Southern Illinois University School of
Law; and Mr. Jerry A. Bell, Jr., Mr. Douglas Y'Barbo, Ms. Meredith Mills, and Ms.
Kathleen S. Rose of Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. for comments on earlier drafts of this
article. The author is particularly indebted to Rebecca A. Hubbell and Michael W.
Morgan of Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. and Matthew E. Coveler, a student at
Georgetown University Law Center, for typing and research assistance. The opinions
expressed herein and the responsibility for any errors are solely the author's.
354 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
1. Medical Expertise .............................................................. 370
2. Ethical Expertise ................................................................ 374
B. Cost, Timeliness, and Ability to Preserve Privacy ................ 376
1. C ost ...................................................................................... 376
2. Timeliness ........................................................................... 378
3. Ability to Preserve Privacy ............................................... 378
C. Objectivity ................................................................................ 378
D. Error Costs Associated with Court Decisions ...................... 381
E. Capacity to Treat Like Cases Alike ....................................... 381
III. EXAMpING THE UNDERLYING PREMISE:
ETHIcs COMMITTEES AS DECISIONMAKERS ............................. 384
A. The Committees' Expertise ..................................................... 384
1. Medical Expertise .............................................................. 384
2. Ethical Expertise ................................................................ 384
B. Cost, Timeliness, and Ability to Preserve Privacy ................ 386
1. C ost ...................................................................................... 386
2. Timeliness ........................................................................... 387
3. Ability to Preserve Privacy ............................................... 387
C. Objectivity ................................................................................ 388
D. Error Costs Associated with Committee Decisions .............. 392
E. Capacity to Treat Like Cases Alike ....................................... 393
F. Conclusion ................................................................................ 394
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVILEGE AND
IMMUNITY STATUTES .................................................................... 394
A. Advantages of Liability .......................................................... 394
1. Liability Promotes Good Decisions ................................. 394
2. Liability Compensates Plaintiffs Who Have
Been Wrongfully Harmed ............................................... 396
3. Adjudication Promotes Social Dialogue on
Significant Issues ............................................................... 396
4. Adjudication Is Essential to the "Guidance
Function of Law" .............................................................. 397
B. Policy Justification for Privilege and Immunity ................... 398
C. Cases Meriting Mandatory Judicial Review .......................... 401
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 404
In the twenty-one years since the New Jersey Supreme Court in
In re Quinlan' seized upon medical ethics committees as a mechanism
"to review the individual circumstances of ethical dilemma[s] and...
provideo ... assistance and safeguards for patients and their medical
1. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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caretakers,"2 ethics committees3 have become a fixture in healthcare
institutions in the United States.4 Comprised of physicians, nurses,
hospital administrators, ethicists, clergy members, lawyers, and
community representatives,5 ethics committees are charged, among
2. Id. at 668 (citing Karen Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What
the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6,9 (1975)).
3. An ethics committee is a "[c]onsultative committee in a hospital or other
institution whose role is to analyze ethical dilemmas and to advise and educate health
care providers, patients and families regarding difficult ethical decisions." OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
ELDERLY 444 (1987); see also Ronald E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera, The
Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES
AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING 5,6 (Ronald E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera
eds., 1984) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES] (defining an ethics
committee as a "multidisciplinary group of health care professionals within a health care
institution").
4. While this Article argues that perceived judicial shortcomings constitute the
primary motivation for the adoption and use of ethics committees, see infra notes 59-76
and accompanying text, the exponential increase in ethics committees has been linked to
a number of causes. Professor McCormick identifies eight cultural variables and social
conditions as the impetus for establishing ethics committees, including the growing
complexity of medical problems and the range of options available for treatment. See
Richard A. McCormick, Ethics Committees: Promise or Peril?, 12 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 150, 150-52 (1984). Professors Fletcher and Hoffmann trace the
development of hospital ethics committees to federal laws mandating institutional review
boards for the protection of human subjects in scientific research. See John C. Fletcher &
Diane E. Hoffmann, Ethics Committees: Time to Experiment with Standards, 120 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 335 (1994). Professor Capron traces the early growth in ethics
committees to the 1984 Child Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994), known
commonly as the "Baby Doe regulations." See Alexander Capron, Legal Perspectives on
Institutional Ethics Committees, 11 J.C. & U.L. 417, 423 (1985). Professor Hoffmann
identifies three external motivating factors for the development of ethics committees: the
Quinlan case, the President's Commission Report, and the Baby Doe regulations, each of
which is discussed more fully throughout this Article. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Evaluating
Ethics Committees: A View from the Outside, 71 MILBANK Q. 677, 677-78 (1993);
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP.]; Child Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5106 (1994); see also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing In re Quinlan);
infra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra); infra
note 17 and accompanying text (discussing Baby Doe regulations).
5. The professional composition of a medical ethics committee may be prescribed by
state law. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-372(a) (1996) (requiring
inclusion of a physician and nurse not directly involved in the care of the patient, a social
worker, and a hospital representative, while also permitting community representatives,
ethical advisers, and clergymen as committee members). Typically, ethics committees are
composed of physicians, nurses, other healthcare professionals such as social workers,
hospital administrators, attorneys, and community representatives. See Diane E.
Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions-Is It Time?, 50 MD.
L. REV. 746,759 (1991) (reporting that 100% of ethics committees surveyed in Maryland
contained at least one physician, 98% had at least one registered nurse, 96% included a
social worker, and 86% included a hospital administrator or designee); Andrew L.
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other tasks,6 "with discussing or resolving ethical dilemmas" that
arise in the healthcare context.7 Such dilemmas may arise when a
patient who is unable to express her wishes is terminally ill or
permanently unconscious and a dispute arises about the continuation
or termination of life-support.8 Although less than one percent of
Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246
n.36 (1987) (citing survey finding 62% of ethics committees contained attorneys).
6. The functions of an ethics committee may be defined by state law. See, e.g.,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7 (1993) (designating the functions of an ethics committee to
include consultation, education, review, and decisionmaking). The four most common
tasks that ethics committees undertake are education of hospital staff and patients about
medical ethics, providing a forum for the discussion of medical ethics issues, participating
in institutional policy development on ethical issues, and case consultation. See Robin
Fretwell Wilson et al., Hospital Ethics Committees: Are They Evaluating Their
Performance?, 5 Hosp. ETHICS COMMrITEE F. 1, 4 (1993). This Article is concerned with
the fourth task-the most controversial function-case consultation, which consists of
ethics committee "participation in individual patient care decisions." Robert M. Veatch,
The Ethics of Institutional Ethics Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITrEES,
supra note 3, at 35, 42; see also David C. Thomasma, Hospital Ethics Committees and
Hospital Policy, QUALITY REV. BULL., July 1985, at 204, 204 ("[P]erhaps the most
important and most problematic role of the hospital ethics committee is consultation.").
7. Randall B. Bateman, Attorneys on Bioethics Committees: Unwelcome Menace or
Valuable Asset?, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 247, 248 (1995). An ongoing controversy exists over
whether ethics committees act only in an advisory capacity or whether in fact they wield
greater power. See Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in
a Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798, 820 (1991); see also infra note 39 and
accompanying text (reviewing arguments that ethics committees act as ultimate
decisionmakers). The possibilities for committee participation in ethical dilemmas are
fourfold, as indicated in the diagram below. In the optional consultation/optional (non-
binding) recommendation and the mandatory consultation/optional (non-binding)
recommendation categories, committees act in a purely advisory role. In contrast, in the
optimal consultation/mandatory (binding) recommendation and the mandatory
consultation/mandatory (binding) recommendation categories, committees act as final
decisionmakers for treatment disputes.
a
Ethics Committees as Decisionmakers_
Required review by Weight accorded Weight accorded
ethics committee? committee committee
recommendation: recommendation:
Optional (non-binding) Mandatory (binding)
Optional advisor decisionmaker
Mandatory advisor decisionmaker
a. See John A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures
and Responsibilities, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS CoMMITrEES, supra note 3, at 85.
8. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIz. L. REV.
821, 827-28 (1994). Other disputes that arise include disputes over whether a patient is
brain dead and disputes over specific types of life-sustaining treatment, such as
ventilatory support or artificial nutrition and hydration. See id. at 828.
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hospitals in the United States had an ethics committee in 1983,' today
eighty-four percent of large American hospitals have established such
committees. 0 Indeed, hospital ethics committees are so ingrained in
American medicine that they have become a part of popular culture.
Ethics consultations, for example, are routinely depicted on popular
television series such as "ER"'" and "Chicago Hope' ' 12 and have
figured prominently in the bestsellers First, Do No Hann 3 and The
Long Dying of Baby Andrew.1
4
Fueling the acceptance of hospital ethics committees are
numerous regulatory bodies and professional associations that have
embraced ethics committees as a way to "avoid cumbersome court
procedures and unwieldy litigation."'5 The President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Biomedical and Behavioral
Research ("President's Commission") led the way in 1983 with its
recommendation that healthcare institutions "explore and evaluate
various ... administrative arrangements for review and consultation,
9. See Stuart J. Youngner et al., Patients' Attitudes Toward Hospital Ethics
Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 73,82.
10. See AMERICAN HosP. ASS'N, HOSPITAL STATISTICS 212 (1994) (representing
hospitals with at least 200 beds). The steady growth in the incidence of ethics committees
is readily apparent. While ethics committees were almost non-existent in 1983, see supra
text accompanying note 9, a 1985 survey found that 60% of large hospitals had
institutional ethics committees, see Ethics Committees Double Since '83: Survey,
HOSPITALS, Nov. 1, 1985, at 60, 64 (citing incidence of ethics committees in hospitals with
at least 200 beds). As noted above, this figure increased to 84% by 1994.
Studies have found that 59% of nursing homes and long-term care institutions have
an ethics committee. See American Ass'n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging, 1997 Ethics
Involvement in Aging Servs. Survey 7 (unpublished results on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (finding that by 1997, 59% of nursing homes had established an ethics
committee). The enormous growth in the number of ethics committees also occurred in
long-term care institutions. Whereas 59% of such institutions now have an ethics
committee, as recently as 1988 only 8% of long-term care facilities had an ethics
committee. See Gary Glasser et al., The Ethics Committee in the Nursing Home! Results
of a National Survey, 36 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 150, 151 (1988) (finding that 8% of
respondents had established a committee).
11. Telephone Interview with Brian Gabriel, Writer Assistant, ER (Sept. 23,1997).
12. Telephone Interview with Dana Anderson, Researcher, Chicago Hope (Sept. 5,
1997).
13. LISA BELKIN, FIRST, Do NO HARM: A SUMMER OF LIFE AND DEATH
DECISIONS AT A TEXAS HOSPITAL (1993) (chronicling the inner workings of the medical
ethics committee at Hermann Hospital in Houston, Texas).
14. ROBERT STINSON & PEGGY STINSON, THE LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW
(1983) (describing ethics committee participation in parents' decision to withdraw life-
sustaining care from their infant son).
15. Janet Fleetwood & Stephanie S. Unger, Institutional Ethics Committees and the
Shield of Immunity, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 320, 320 (1994) (quoting from the
abstract of the article).
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such as 'ethics committees,' particularly for decisions that have life
and death consequences."' 6  The President's Commission's
recommendation was quickly followed by endorsements by the
Department of Health and Human Services, 7 the American Medical
Association, 8 the American Nurses Association, 9 the American
Hospital Association,' and other professional medical
organizations.' Most significantly, the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO"), an
accrediting organization that is influential in determining a hospital's
ability to participate in Medicare," mandated in 19922 that healthcare
organizations address ethical issues in providing patient care.24 This
standard commonly is satisfied by a hospital ethics committee.2
16. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 5.
17. See Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 45 C.F.R. § 84
app. C (1996) (encouraging hospitals to establish "infant care review committees" to
review cases involving the withholding of life-sustaining treatment of newborns).
18. See Judicial Council, Guidelines for Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions,
253 JAMA 2698-99 (1985) (suggesting procedures for ethics committee review).
19. See AMERICAN NURSES ASS'N, CODE FOR NURSES WITH INTERPRETATIVE
STATEMENTS 7 (1985) (exhorting nurses to "participate in the ... establishment[,] ... of
review mechanisms that serve to safeguard clients," such as duly established ethics
committees).
20. See AMERICAN HoSP. ASS'N, GUIDELINES: HOSPITAL COMMITTEES ON
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, reprinted in JUDITH WILSON Ross ET AL., HANDBOOK FOR
HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 110, 110-11 (1986) (suggesting procedures for ethics
committee review).
21. See generally James E. Strain, The American Academy of Pediatrics Comments on
the "Baby Doe II" Regulations, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 443 (1983) (endorsing use of
"infant care review committees" in medical decisionmaking for infants).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a)(1) (1994) (establishing the effect of JCAHO
accreditation). Medicare payments for inpatient hospital care totaled approximately $87
billion in fiscal year 1997 and are projected to climb to $94 billion in 2002. See Eric
Weissenstein, Budget Bill a Mixed Bag: Providers Criticize Spending Cuts, Back Medicare
Reforms, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 4, 1997, at 6, 6. Medicare and Medicaid payments
accounted for 30.8% of the total healthcare spending in the United States in 1993, making
Medicare participation critical for a hospital's fiscal solvency. See Mary Onnis Waid,
Health Care Financing Administration, Brief Summaries of Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act (last modified June 24, 1995) <http://www.netreach.net/-wmanning/
medicare.htm#Background>.
23. See Matthew D. Jenkins, Hospital Ethics Committees: Creation and Purposes, in
PRESENTATIONS OF THE 1992 CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
HOSPITAL ATTORNEYS 1 (1992) (describing the JCAHO requirement as a watershed in
the development of hospital ethics committees).
24. See JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., 1995
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 66 (1995) (discussing
Standard RI.1 for accreditation, which requires a "functioning process to address ethical
issues").
25. See id (stating that "[p]atient rights mechanisms may include a variety of
implementation strategies; for example, established ethics committees, the use of a
[Vol. 76
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Also fueling the spread of ethics committees are various state
statutes and regulations. Two states, Maryland and New Jersey, V
require healthcare institutions to establish ethics committees. 
28
Arizona permits an attending physician in the absence of a surrogate
to make healthcare decisions for a patient after she consults with an
ethics committee,29 while Hawaii grants full decisionmaking authority
in patient care to an ethics committee.?
Courts also have welcomed the use of ethics committees. For
example, Judge Miner, writing for the Second Circuit, suggested that
a state might "require the establishment of local ethics committees as
resources for physicians" in order to deal with such difficult questions
as physician assisted suicide. 1 Similarly, the D.C. Court of Appeals
has "urge[d] the establishment-through legislation or otherwise-of
formalized ethics forum, ethics consultations, or any combination of these or other
methods"). JCAHO's accreditation requirement may hasten the advent of an ethics
committee in every hospital receiving federal funds. See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1.
Professors Fletcher and Hoffmann have observed, however, that JCAHO's "'notably
vague' requirement allows for vast diversity among institutions to address ethical issues in
patient care." Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 335. By implication, the
requirement may not give rise to an ethics committee or consulting service in each
JCAHO-accredited institution. See id
26. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II §§ 19-371 to -374 (1996) (requiring all
licensed nursing homes and hospitals to have a "patient care advisory committee").
27. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 43G-5.1(h) (1997) (requiring licensed hospitals to
have either an ethics committee or a "prognosis" committee). In contrast to a medical
ethics committee, a prognosis committee fulfills an essentially medical function. A
prognosis committee is assigned the task of agreeing or disagreeing with the responsible
attending physician's determination "that there is not reasonable possibility of [a patient]
ever emerging from ... [a] comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state." In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976) (discussing the role of a "prognosis committee");
cf. notes 3 and 6 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and functions of medical
ethics committees).
28. A third state, New York, has considered legislation that would make ethics
committees mandatory for healthcare institutions. See Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note
4, at 335. On a national level, Senate Bill 1766 would have required all healthcare
institutions or programs in the United States that received Medicare and Medicaid
payments in the United States to establish an ethics committee. See S. 1766, 101st Cong.
(1989).
29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231 (West Supp. 1996) (permitting a
healthcare provider to consult with and obtain the recommendations of an institutional
ethics committee when a surrogate is unavailable).
30. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7 (1993) (designating the functions of an ethics
committee to include decisionmaking).
31. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,731 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 117
S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997); see also Sevems v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334,
1349-50 (Del. 1980) (suggesting that ethics committees can assist in evidentiary hearings);
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,463-64 (N.J. 1987) (Pollack, J., concurring) (arguing that ethics
committees can assist family members and healthcare professionals in making end-of-life
decisions for incapacitated patients).
1998]
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another tribunal to make [life-and-death] decisions, with limited
opportunity for judicial review."32 Other courts have suggested that
an affirmation by an ethics committee of a family's decision to
withdraw life support would serve as persuasive evidence on certain
legal questions33 or, more dramatically, eliminate the need for judicial
approval?
The central driving force behind this wholehearted embrace of
ethics committees by courts, legislators, and healthcare professionals
is a single, fiercely held, but untested assumption: that the resolution
of conflicts by ethics committees "avoid[s] cumbersome court
procedures and unwieldy litigation."35  According to conventional
wisdom, the judicial system's "bureaucratic, adversarial approach is
not designed to address humanely the emotional issues faced by
patients and health care professionals struggling with life threatening
issues."' 6 Taking up this mantra, several commentators have asserted
32. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (D.C. 1990).
33. See, e.g., In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Mass. 1980) (concluding that the
opinion of ethics committee may be persuasive evidence of good faith and good medical
practice); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (Mass.
1977) (permitting court to consider findings of ethics committees on questions of
foregoing life-sustaining treatment); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 73-74
(Wis. 1992) (holding that a guardian should request review by an ethics committee and
consider its opinion in determining the patient's best interest).
34. See In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 n.4 (Minn. 1984)
(discussing termination of life support from a patient in a persistent vegetative state).
Legislation proposed in at least one state would have permitted ethics committee
determinations to substitute for judicial review. See Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 750 &
n.18 (citing Health Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Association, Proposed
Amendments to the H.G. § 20-107: Individuals Who Are Terminally Ill or in a Persistent
Vegetative State (Nov. 6, 1990)).
35. Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 320 (quoting from the abstract of the
article).
36. Janet E. Fleetwood et al., Giving Answers or Raising Questions?: The
Problematic Role of Institutional Ethics Committees, 15 J. MED. ETHICS 137, 138 (1989);
see also American Acad. of Pediatrics, Guidelines on Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment, 93 PEDIATRICS 532, 533 (1994) ("Recourse to the courts should be reserved
for occasions when adjudication is clearly required by law or when concerned parties have
disagreements that they cannot resolve, despite appropriate consultation, concerning
matters of substantial importance."); Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 321 (stating
that immunity statutes "support the public's interest in keeping personal, private
decisions out of courts, which may be slow, expensive, and insensitive to the values at
stake"); Jill Hollander, Health Care Proxies: New York's Attempt to Resolve the Right to
Die Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 145, 171 (1991) ("[T]he judiciary is not the proper
forum for resolving these types of cases, as these cases necessarily have serious time-
constraints, and involve complex issues, both medical and social, that are better left to
those with more expertise in the area."); John J. Paris & Frank E. Reardon, Ethics
Committees in Critical Care, 2 CRITICAL CARE CLINICS 111, 113 (1986) ("When asked to
make actual treatment decisions, the courts are acutely aware of their limitations and lack
[Vol. 76
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that committees are a viable alternative to inefficacious judicial
involvement.37
Until recently, however, an essential corollary to this well-
accepted assumption was that ethics committees properly function as
an adjunct to the courtsrs performing concurrent case review that
of clinical experience."); Steven M. Richard, Someone Make up My Mind- The Troubling
Right to Die Issues Presented by Incompetent Patients with No Prior Expression of a
Treatment Preference, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 394,414 (1989) ("Judicial review of cases
involving the withholding of medical treatment has proven to be an expensive, time
consuming, and indeterminate process."); Robert F. Weir & Larry Gostin, Decisions to
Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Non-Autonomous Patients: Ethical Standards and
Legal Liability for Physicians After Cruzan, 264 JAMA 1846, 1848 (1990) ("The judicial
system is too expensive, time consuming, and cumbersome for dealing with the personal
matter of deciding whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment.").
37. Most notably, the President's Commission stated:
The Commission believes that ethics committees ... can be more rapid and
sensitive than judicial review: they are closer to the treatment setting, their
deliberations are informal and typically private (and are usually regarded by
their participants as falling within the general rules of medical confidentiality),
and they are able to reconvene easily or delegate decisions to a separate group
of members.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 168-69. Similarly, Professor Levine noted
that "committees ... may avoid unnecessary recourse to litigation by aiding in the
resolution of disagreements." Carol Levine, Questions and (Some Very Tentative)
Answers About Hospital Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1984, at 9, 10.
Professors White and Fletcher concluded that "internal review [by an ethics committee or
ethics consultation service] is preferable to judicial review." Margot L. White & John C.
Fletcher, The Patient Self-Determination AcL" On Balance, More Help than Hindrance,
266 JAMA 410, 411 (1991). Professor Scott found ethics committees particularly
beneficial for patient's families, stating that "[a] less costly and less intrusive alternative
[to judicial review] would be review by a committee modeled on a hospital ethics
committee." Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive
Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 852-53. According to Professor Scott,
"[t]he rigorous procedural and substantive requirements under current law [which include
mandatory judicial review] impose formidable costs on the family, in terms of money,
time expended, and psychological stress." Id. at 855. In addition, "parents seeking
sterilization will have to hire an attorney to pursue their objective. They have to pay for
mental health evaluations and will often be forced to miss time from work." Id. at 856;
see also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 255, 256 (1991) ("At the
least, ethics committees may obviate the need to go to court .... [C]ommittees may also
operate without paying scrupulous attention to the letter of the law or by finding a
loophole that will sanction their recommendation."); Michael Vitiello, On Letting
Seriously Ill Minors Die: A Review of Louisiana's Natural Death Act, 31 LoY. L. REV. 67,
82 (1985) (quoting President's Commission's statement that ethics committees can be
more rapid and sensitive than judicial review, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note
4, at 168-69).
38. See, e.g., Hollander, supra note 36, at 171 (concluding that "the ultimate decision-
making responsibility" should probably remain with the courts); Susan M. Wolf, Toward a
Theory of Process, 20 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 278, 286 (1992) ("One corollary of
respect for patient autonomy will be that the ethics committee should remain entirely
advisory.... At most, the committee should help trigger a judicial determination.").
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may in turn be reviewed by a court. 9 As a result of legislation
recently passed by a number of states granting privilege and
immunity to ethics committee members and physicians who
implement committee recommendations, the historical inter-
relationship between the courts and hospital ethics committees is
beginning to change. In states such as Arizona,' Hawaii,4
39. An ongoing controversy exists over whether ethics committees do decide and
should decide cases or merely act in an advisory capacity. One position is that "the use of
[ethics] committees ... is purely optional and the role of committees is solely advisory."
Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 746 n.1. A contrary position maintains that "[t]oday's ethics
committees ... often command greater notice and their recommendations may be seen as
more binding." Karen Ritchie, When It's Not Really Optional, HASTINGS CrR. REP.,
Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 25; see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics
Committees Make a Difference? A Study of Hospital Ethics Committees in Maryland, the
District of Columbia, and Virginia, 19 LAW, MED & HEALTH CARE 105, 115 (1991)
(reporting that 42% of respondents in survey of hospital staff in five Maryland hospitals
"thought that the role of the [hospital ethics] committee was to decide ethical issues").
Taking a middle ground, Professor Wolf suggests that "committees partake of both
[consultation and actual adjudication], pursuing sometimes one and sometimes the
other.... One minute the [committee] members will see the group as a committee
advising caregivers; the next minute they will see it as a body for resolving or actually
deciding treatment disputes." Wolf, supra note 7, at 820. This "double identity,"
Professor Wolf believes, arises from the fact that ethics committees "serve two
masters"--patient and institution. Id.
Professor Wolf persuasively argues that the precise model under which a committee
operates will vary from committee to committee and perhaps, for a given committee,
from case to case, depending not only on the committee's changing understanding of its
own role, but also on the weight accorded to the committee's recommendations by
physicians, patients, and institutional actors. See id. passim; see also Robertson, supra
note 7a., at 88 (discussing four different possibilities for committee participation in ethical
dilemmas). Clearly, however, where a committee's recommendation is binding on
healthcare providers and families that consult with the ethics committee (whether as a
result of hospital policy or mutual agreement), the committee acts as the ultimate
decisionmaker. See Wolf, supra note 7, at 821.
But even if a particular committee has authority only to give advice, the grant of
statutory immunity for actions taken in reliance on committee advice may effectively
make the committee the final decisionmaker. That is, if a healthcare professional would
be subject to possible liability if she did not follow the committee's advice, but would be
immune for following such advice, she would be very hesitant not to follow the
committee's advice. Put another way, the healthcare professional will seek the comfort
and security of the "safe harbor" created by the grant of immunity.
40. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231 (West Supp. 1996) (providing healthcare
professionals immunity from criminal and civil liability, as well as professional discipline,
if healthcare provider's actions or refusals to act are made in good faith reliance upon the
advice of the committee).
41. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7 (1993) (granting civil immunity for ethics
committee members, for any person who files a complaint, and for any committee witness
before the committee for any acts done in the furtherance of the committee's purpose, so
long as the action is without malice). Professors Fleetwood and Unger contend that this
statute provides broad legal protection for physicians who implement a committee's
recommendations. See Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 320.
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Maryland, 2 and Montana,43 which now grant immunity from civil or
criminal liability to members of ethics committees or healthcare
providers who rely on committee advice, disputes considered by an
ethics committee are increasingly unlikely to be reviewed
substantively by a court. As a result, ethics committees are
transformed from an adjunct to the judiciary into a forum of last
resort.45 Also problematic are privilege statutes such as those in
42. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-374 (1996) (granting immunity to the
committee, its members, and those who assisted in the committee's establishment from
liability arising from advice given in good faith and providing that there will be no liability
for the failure to carry out the advice of the committee if it is inconsistent with the
hospital's written policies).
43. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201 (1995) (granting immunity to medical ethics
review committee members if their recommendation is made without malice and in the
reasonable belief that the recommendation is warranted by the information known to
them after a reasonable effort to obtain the necessary facts, and providing that the
proceedings and records of the committee are not subject to discovery or introduction
into evidence).
44. Significantly, immunity may be available to ethics committees and their members
under state surrogate decisionmaking or advance directive statutes. See, e.g., Kate
McMillan, Pre-Directives: Paper Swords and Shields, ADVOCATE: IDAHO ST. B., May
1994, at 10, 10 (noting that Idaho's Medical Consent Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4301 to -
4306 (1993), "affords blanket civil immunity to surrogate decision makers").
A 1992 proposal of the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law would have
given the advice of an ethics committee similar protection. See THE NEw YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR
PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY app. at 266 (1992) ("No health care provider or
employee thereof shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability, or be deemed to have
engaged in unprofessional conduct, for honoring in good faith a health care decision made
pursuant to this article .... "). The Model Bill to Establish Hospital Ethics Committees,
presented in the President's Commission Report, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra
note 4, at 439, also embraced a presumption in favor of immunity for doctors
implementing difficult treatment decisions. See id. at 441. It provided that "[t]he hospital
staff, administration, and the responsible physician shall have the benefit of a
presumption of freedom from civil and criminal liability for their actions taken in
accordance with the committee's recommendation. Proof of gross negligence or wilfull
[sic] disregard of the patient's interests overcomes this presumption." Id. But see
Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 320 (discussing New Jersey's Commission on Legal
and Ethical Problems in the Delivery of Health Care that rejected statutory protection for
individuals who follow a committee's advice, but which lost its funding before a legislative
proposal could be drafted).
45. As Fleetwood & Unger explain, "[immunity statutes] provide that persons who
comply with the legislation and carry out activities as mandated by the statute may not be
found civilly or criminally liable for any breach of personal interests resulting from
compliance." Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 321. Concededly, these immunity
statutes do not grant absolute immunity. See 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 7.01, at 3 (3d ed. 1991)
(describing the grant of absolute immunity to judges, prosecutors, and legislators under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). Qualified immunity nonetheless insulates committee proceedings
from judicial oversight in three ways. First, if there is no question of fact regarding the
good faith of the committee or healthcare provider, the committee or provider will prevail
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Maryland and Montana,47 which insulate the records of ethics
committees. In addition to these emerging statutes, existing state
statutes designed to protect tissue utilization, peer review, and other
healthcare committees have been interpreted to shield ethics
committees.' Such statutes "protect [committee] proceedings against
on summary judgment. See Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg. Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318,
1333-34 (11th Cir. 1994). Second, when there is a question of fact for the jury regarding
good faith, the leeway granted by the defense of qualified immunity encompasses an
enlarged realm of acceptability, insulating what may in hindsight be viewed as negligence.
See, e.g., 2 NAHMOD, supra, § 8.04, at 116 (noting a significant margin of error for
defendants under § 1983, which imposes a good faith requirement upon governmental
actors who receive qualified immunity). Third, the "most meaningful effect of the
immunity provisions may be the allowance of attorney's fees in frivolous cases," which act
as a "useful deterrent to cases that are filed merely to delay proceedings or to intimidate
[committee] members." The Problem of Good Faith (visited Sept. 9, 1997)
<http'J/plague.law.umkc.edu/xfiles/x531.htm> (making this observation about immunity
for peer review committees); see also Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and
the Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1117, 1161 (1986) (noting that statutory
immunity for peer review activities under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 "may serve to deter some lawsuits.... [Because] the statute raises the plaintiff's
stakes in the litigation by a fee-shifting provision"). Further frustrating the plaintiff's
likelihood of success is the grant of privilege to ethics committee records and proceedings.
See infra notes 46-51, 196-99, and 208-13 and accompanying text (discussing impact of
privilege statutes on judicial redress).
Of course, statutes providing privilege and immunity do not prohibit injunctive relief.
Thus, patients or families who are unhappy with the decision made by their provider or
the ethics committee could still go to court for injunctive relief mandating treatment or
withdrawal of treatment. In this instance, the ethics committee, strictly speaking, is not a
forum of last resort. Where, however, courts give deference to an ethics committee's
determination, or permit the committee's determination to substitute for judicial review,
the ethics committee will effectively be the final decisionmaker. See supra notes 31-34
and accompanying text (discussing limits on judicial review suggested by courts).
Similarly, where patients and their families lack the time, financial resources, or
sophistication to go to court for injunctive relief, the ethics committee will functionally be
a court of last resort. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (reviewing arguments that
ethics committees act as ultimate decisionmakers); infra note 73 and accompanying text
(observing that patients frequently die before their rights to reject treatment are
vindicated in court). I am indebted to Professor Peters of the University of Missouri -
Columbia School of Law for pointing out the possibility of injunctive relief.
46. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-374(e) (1996) (extending to advisory
committees the protections afforded medical review committees under another section of
the Maryland Code, see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 14-501 (1994), which makes
the proceedings, records, and files of a medical review committee confidential and not
admissible or discoverable).
47. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201(2) (1995) (stating that "[ihe proceedings and
records of ... medical ethics review ... committees are not subject to discovery or
introduction into evidence in any proceeding").
48. See, e.g., Dade County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (holding reports of ethics committees protected, even though they would not be
protected under a literal interpretation of the statute). Numerous commentators have
suggested that medical ethics committees may fall within the ambit of state peer review
statutes. See, e.g., Marta Fisher Linenberger, Hospital Ethics Committees in Kansas, J.
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discovery, prohibit disclosure of what transpired at committee
meetings, and exclude testimony or documents relating to the
committee's actions from evidence in court proceedings."49  This
"privilege" frustrates judicial review of committee actions, erecting
"a major obstacle to patients' suits against doctors or hospitals"' by
making a committee's wrongdoing or neglect unobservable and
therefore nearly impossible to substantiate in litigation."
By shutting off access to the courts, statutes that grant immunity
or insulate against discovery effectively anoint the ethics committee
(or healthcare provider who consults with the committee) as the final
arbiter of the patient's fate.' This is not to say that state efforts to
immunize and grant privilege to ethics committees are without their
benefits. Indeed, the virtue is striking and obvious to any ethicist,
healthcare provider, layperson, or attorney who has served-
generally without pay-on an ethics committee or participated in an
ethics committee consultation. The benefits do not alter, however,
the fundamental effect of privilege and immunity statutes: to recast
ethics committees as the final forum for end-of-life decisions.
This Article attempts to take a step backward and examine what
KAN. B. ASs'N, Dec. 1994, at 43 (noting that if an ethics committee in Kansas is
constituted as a committee of the medical staff, state law "may insulate the committee's
actions provided the actions are in good faith and without malice"). But see B. Abbott
Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. &
MED. 151, 153 (1984) (suggesting that because "courts have been very literal in
interpreting [existing] peer review statutes," new state or federal legislation may be
necessary to protect ethics committees).
49. Merritt, supra note 5, at 1252.
50. Goldberg, supra note 48, at 155; see also Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at
321 (stating that "immunity provisions for health care professionals who follow advice
from ethics committees ... support the public's interest in keeping persona4 private
decisions out of courts" (emphasis added)).
51. See Goldberg, supra note 48, at 166 & n.84 (citing Robert Charles Clark, Does the
Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1462-63 (1980)); see
also Merritt, supra note 5, at 1253 ("Without evidence, a plaintiff has no case. These
evidentiary statutes, therefore, may as a practical matter also lead to immunity for the
covered hospital committee.").
52. It is difficult to conceive of a cause of action against an ethics committee because
the committee's procedural duties and responsibilities remain largely undefined. See
Wolf, supra note 38, at 278 ("[W]e see no systematic effort to study process itself, yoke it
to appropriate values, and demand that process do right by the patient. It is a gaping hole
in medical ethics."). At a minimum, however, it must be assumed that an ethics
committee has a duty to give ethical advice within the limits of the law. While one might
argue that there are no right answers in the realm of ethics, some legal responsibilities
and obligations can be clear-cut. An example of negligent advice by a committee would
be a recommendation of assisted suicide in a state that has made such an action illegal.
Such advice might well be "ethically" sound, but still would be negligent based upon its
illegality.
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heretofore has been untested: the basic tenet of the ethics committee
movement that the committees are better suited to end-of-life
decisionmaking than the courts. 3 Part I reviews the pervasive
endorsement of ethics committees as a "good way to resolve complex
ethical issues in patient care [without resorting to] the costly, often
adversarial, legal system." 4 Part II examines arguments for and
against a court's competence to render decisions in refusal of
treatment and other cases involving medical ethics issues.' Part III
then considers advantages and disadvantages of using ethics
committees as a substitute for judicial resolution of troubling medical
ethics cases.56 Part IV considers the impact of privilege and immunity
statutes on judicial review and questions whether such legislation is
appropriate in a legal system that couples responsibility with
accountabilityY Finally, Part V concludes that courts should bear the
final authority for patient care decisions.5
53. Although this Article is concerned with choosing the best decisionmaker when a
patient lacks capacity to direct his own treatment, both committees and courts, albeit by
necessity, are substituting their judgment for that of the patient. Thus, "[p]atients might
wonder what they can hope to gain when judicial orders 'substitute bureaucratic authority
for professional authority.' From the patient's point of view, there is only paternalism,
with the legal system engaging medicine in a struggle over which ought to fill the role of
father." Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1991)
(quoting JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 228 (1984)).
54. Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 320; see infra notes 59-76 and
accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 82-155 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 160-207 and accompanying text. Importantly, ethics committees
are by no means the only mechanisms developed as alternatives to the courts. Professors
White and Fletcher note that "[o]ne purpose of advance directives [or "living wills"] is to
avoid recourse to the courts to resolve difficulties associated with decision making for
incapacitated patients." White & Fletcher, supra note 37, at 411 (discussing advantages
of advance directives or "living wills," which are written expressions of a patient's
preferences for the provision or withholding of medical treatment that operate when the
patient lacks capacity to express her wishes). The significant distinction between statutes
authorizing advance directives and the use of hospital ethics committees, however, is that
advance directives avoid court oversight while giving voice to the wishes of the patient.
The use of an ethics committee as a substitute for judicial review cannot make such a
claim and must ground its authority in efficiency, expertise, and other justifications. See
infra notes 82-155 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 208-257 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text. Of course, society can designate
other bodies to bear the responsibility for final patient care decisions. Sigrid Fry-Revere
suggests the following approaches: (1) professional self-regulation through such
mechanisms as accreditation or certification; (2) regulation by state and local government
in the form of licensure or professional discipline; (3) federal government regulation
through peer review organizations or other mechanisms; (4) court-enforced
accountability; (5) the creation of a government commission to build consensus about the
appropriate use of ethics committees; and (6) institutional self-regulation through such
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I. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF THE ETHICS COMM1TEE
MOVEMENT: COMMITTEES ARE BETTER FORUMS FOR
RESOLUTION OF ETHICAL ISSUES THAN COURTS
Hospital ethics committees have been touted as an excellent
means of resolving complex medical ethics issues without resort to
the costly, adversarial legal system." The President's Commission
encouraged the development of ethics committees that "do not
supplant the principal decisionmakers [i.e., the patients, families, and
healthcare providers,] but [that] provide for efficient review without
regularly incurring the liabilities of judicial review."'  The
Commission identified four principal shortcomings of judicial review:
[It] is costly in terms of time and expense; it can disrupt the
process of providing care for the patient, since medical
decisionmaking is evolutionary rather than static; it can
create unnecessary strains in the relationship between the
surrogate decisionmaker and others, such as the health care
providers, who may be forced into the role of formal
adversaries in the litigation; and it exposes ordinarily quite
private matters to the scrutiny of the courtroom and
sometimes even to the glare of the public communications
media. 1
Commentators and scholars have taken up this mantra and
embraced committees as a viable alternative to judicial involvement."2
In so doing, they have identified three additional limitations to court
authority for end-of-life decisionmaking: that courts lack the
technical, medical, and ethical expertise necessary to make such
decisions;' that courts "may be insensitive to the values at stake" in
mechanisms as institutional review boards or peer review committees. See SIGRID FRY-
REVERE, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF BIOETHIcs COMMI-rEES AND CONSULTANTS 78-92
(1992). Because regulation, whether governmental control or self-regulation, does not
seem to be on the immediate horizon, see Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 335
(discussing absence of standards to evaluate the performance of hospital ethics
committees), consideration of the relative capacities of the courts and ethics committees
to make patient care decisions is appropriate, see Wilson et al., supra note 6, at 1
(discussing results of national study that found rudimentary self-evaluation of
performance by hospital ethics committees).
59. See Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 320. While this section attempts to
establish perceived judicial incompetence as the overarching factor in the adoption and
use of ethics committees, the growth of the ethics committee movement has been linked
to a number of causes. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
60. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 164 (emphasis added).
61. Id at 159.
62. See supra notes 36-37 (cataloguing articles endorsing the use of ethics
committees).
63. See Hollander, supra note 36, at 171 ("[Tjhese cases ... involve complex issues,
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these cases;" and that judicial involvement increases stress on the
family unit, disrupts family functioning, and discourages family
involvement.
Echoing these concerns, many courts have recognized the limits
of judicial review." The New Jersey Supreme Court, which first
advocated in Quinlan the establishment of ethics committees as a
way to improve medical decisionmaking,67 reasoned that "a practice
of applying to a court to confirm such decisions would generally be
inappropriate, not only because that would be a gratuitous
encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence, but
because it would be impossibly cumbersome."" Similarly, in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,9 Justice Scalia scolded
that "[t]his Court need not, and has no authority to, inject itself into
both medical and social, that are better left to those with more expertise in the area.");
see also Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?:
Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. RE V. 957, 968 (1990)
(noting concerns about "judges' abilities to interpret social science data"). Judges also
may lack the expertise to make good ethical decisions. See, e.g., Perlin, supra, at 968
(stating that competency questions include concerns about "judges' ... capacity to ...
'unpack' their own decision-making processes").
64. Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 321; see Perlin, supra note 63, at 968
(noting concerns about "judges' abilities ... to render thoughtful decisions in areas that
cause them a significant amount of personal discomfort").
65. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) (finding a requirement of a formal
adversary hearing prior to hospitalization of minor children disruptive to the family and a
deterrent to seeking needed treatment); Richard, supra note 36, at 414 ("Judicial
involvement may suppress familial evaluation of the patient's needs, as it tends to suggest
that the family has no control over the loved one's destiny."); Scott, supra note 37, at 856
(stating that mandatory judicial review of sterilization of retarded individuals
"predictably create[s] greater tension within a family unit already subject to considerable
stress," which in turn can "have a disruptive effect on [parents'] ability to care for the
child").
66. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 667, 674 (Ariz. 1986); In re
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292,295 (Ill. 1989); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,449 (N.J. 1987); see
also Hollander, supra note 36, at 171 & nn.112, 113 ("[C]ourts realize that the judiciary is
not the proper forum for resolving these types of cases, as these cases necessarily have
serious time-constraints, and involve complex issues, both medical and social, that are
better left to those with more expertise in the area."); Weir & Gostin, supra note 36, at
1848 ("Most courts have consequently concluded that such judicial intervention [in life-
sustaining treatment cases] is both unnecessary and counterproductive except to protect
the lives of nonautonomous patients who have no surrogate.").
67. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (N.J. 1976). The majority of commentators
agree that while the Quinlan court contemplated a prognosis committee-charged with
the task of confirming the medical diagnosis-it intended future ethics committees to
have more "multidisciplinary" tasks. See Capron, supra note 4, at 422-23; see also note 27
and accompanying text (describing function of a prognosis committee).
68. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669.
69. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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every field of human activity where irrationality and oppression may
theoretically occur, and if it tries to do so it will destroy itself."70 In
Parham v. JR.,7' the United States Supreme Court characterized
formal adversary pre-admission hearings as "time-consuming
procedural minuets.'"' A lower court similarly remarked that "[t]oo
many patients have died before their right to reject treatment was
vindicated in court."'  And the Minnesota Supreme Court observed
in In re Conservatorship of Torre? that judicial review of situations
involving termination of medical treatment would inundate the trial
courts.75 These advocates, though, appear to have assumed an
underlying premise: that ethics committees are better equipped than
the courts to make the final decisions on medical ethics issues.76 Parts
II and III examine this assumption.
70. Id. at 300-01 (Scalia, J., concurring). Similarly, writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that "we do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State
to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself." Id. at 286.
Lower courts have also expressed no wish to wrench private decisions away from the
parties in interest. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (There is "no legal requirement that prior judicial approval is necessary
before any decision to withdraw treatment can be made"); Barber v. Superior Court, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("[R]equiring judicial intervention in all cases is
unnecessary and may be unwise."); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990) ("[W]e
are loath to impose a cumbersome legal proceeding at such a delicate time in those many
cases where the patient neither needs not desires additional protection.").
71. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
72. Id. at 605 (upholding a Georgia statute that authorized parents to place their
minor children in psychiatric hospitals).
73. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (N.J. 1987). Patients' deaths occurred during the
judicial proceedings in Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986), and In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1219 (N.J. 1985).
74. 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (en banc).
75. See id. at 341 n.4 (estimating ten patients per week removed from life support in
Minnesota alone). The American Hospital Association estimates that 4200 end-of-life
choices need to be made each day in the United States. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Judge
Allows Feeding Tube Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,1990, at A10.
76. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (cataloging the putative advantages
of participation by ethics committees in end-of-life decisionmaking). In addition to
describing the limitations of judicial review, the President's Commission identified a
number of advantages of court proceedings. First, "the judicial process is a public one."
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 159. Second, adjudication by the courts
should lead to principled and impartial decisions. See a Third, the adversarial process
encourages full exposition of the issues. See id. Although recognizing these advantages
of courts, the President's Commission concluded that the benefits of ethics committees on
the whole outweigh their drawbacks if judicial review is available when necessary. See id.
at 160.
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II. EXAMINING THE UNDERLYING PREMISE: COURTS AS
DECISIONMAKERS
We can assess the relative ability of courts and ethics committees
to resolve medical ethics controversies by looking at the medical and
"ethical" expertise of each body;' the cost, timeliness, and ability to
preserve privacy offered by courts and ethics committees; 8 the
objectivity of courts and ethics committees; the error costs
associated with court and committee decisions;90 and the capacity of
each to treat like cases alike. This analysis will look first at the
courts and then at ethics committees, beginning with the technical
expertise of the courts.
A. The Courts' Expertise
Criticism of the courts' expertise may be divided into two
separate claims: first, that courts lack the medical expertise
necessary to make treatment withdrawal decisions, and, indeed, have
made grave mistakes; and second, that courts lack the requisite
ethical expertise.
1. Medical Expertise
Many commentators have criticized courts as lacking sufficient
medical expertise to decide medical ethics issues." Examining these
criticisms, former D.C. Circuit Judge David Bazelon stated that
[v]ery few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are
economists, aeronautical engineers, atomic scientists, or
marine biologists. For some reason, however, many people
seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a
proposed dam on fish life, while they reject similar scrutiny
of the effect of psychiatric treatment on human lives.... [I]t
77. See infra notes 82-116 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of courts); infra
notes 160-69 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of ethics committees).
78. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of courts); infra
notes 170-80 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of ethics committees).
79. See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of courts); infra
notes 181-99 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of ethics committees).
80. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of courts); infra
notes 200-05 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of ethics committees).
81. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of courts); infra
notes 206-07 and accompanying text (analyzing capacity of ethics committees).
82. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1996) (discussing judicial review as "a
gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence"); Hollander,
supra note 36, at 171 (noting that treatment disputes "involve complex [medical] issues
... that are better left to those with more expertise in the area").
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can hardly be said that we are more concerned for the
salmon than the schizophrenic....
Judges have, however, sometimes reached mistaken factual
conclusions regarding technical expert testimony. 84  In end-of-life
decisions, judges appear to have difficulty assimilating and weighing
complex medical informafion.' Moreover, as Michael Flick points
out, "[j]udges know less than doctors or patients about th[e]
uncertainty" surrounding death and the implications this has for the
decisions to be made.' Finally, few state court judges encounter end-
of-life decisions, and for those judges who do, such cases arise only
once every six and a half years.8 Consequently, courts have little
83. David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742,
743 (1969).
84. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 355 A.2d 527 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); see also E.
Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 495 (1989) (commenting that judges "are not
known for their scientific literacy"); John W. Osborne, Note, Judicial/Technical
Assessment of Novel Scientific Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 524 (arguing that "a
lay judge may be in no better position than a lay juror to evaluate" scientific testimony);
John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 675, 683, 685-86 (1984) (questioning ability of judges and juries to
comprehend and evaluate complex scientific evidence). The Smith opinion held that since
the psychological stress evaluator ("PSE") was equivalent to a polygraph, and since
Maryland courts do not admit polygraph evidence, evidence of a PSE test was also
inadmissible. See Smith, 355 A.2d at 535-36. In fact, PSE is technologically distinct from
the polygraph. See Ching Wah Chin, Note, Protecting Employees and Neglecting
Technology Assessment: The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 1315,1332 (1990) (observing that "PSE is very different from a polygraph because a
person can be tested by the PSE without that person's knowledge" and because "the PSE
only measures one physiological response while the polygraph measures three").
85. See Tom Hafemeister, Helping the Courts Decide: Decision-Making Regarding
Life-Sustaining Treatment Project of the National Center for State Courts (1989-1991), in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS' COLLOQUY FOR STATE APPELLATE
COURT JUDGES: LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS: STATE JURISPRUDENCE AFTER
CRUZAN AND WEBSTER 67, 67-68 (Margot L. White ed., 1992) [hereinafter COLLOQUY
PROCEEDINGS]. Professor Hafemeister discussed the results of a survey of state court
judges' experience with life-sustaining medical treatment cases conducted by the National
Center for State Courts. Interpreting the survey results, he found that judges had
difficulty with these cases because they "often rais[e] factual questions about which the
judge has limited knowledge," id. at 67, and "many of the judges had difficulty evaluating
the medical testimony they received," id. at 68; see also Bernard Lo et al., Family
Decisionmaking on Triab Who Decides for Incompetent Patients?, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1228, 1229 (1990) (questioning whether judicial rulings are based on sound clinical
information).
86. Flick, supra note 53, at 1164. Presumably, ethics committee members-as
professionals intimately close to the clinical context-will have a better understanding of
the uncertainty of clinical prognosis.
87. See Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 67 (reporting results of survey of state court
judges).
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opportunity to accumulate expertise in such matters.m
Although widespread, these criticisms prove fundamentally
unfounded. First, courts have in fact confronted complex technical
evidence in cases concerning computer technology,89 environmental
science,' ° epidemiology,9 psychology, and economics. Indeed, if
lack of medical expertise is sufficient to defeat court jurisdiction over
end-of-life decisions, then it seems equally likely to defeat
jurisdiction over every dispute requiring assessment of scientific or
economic data. Such wholesale disqualification would leave the
courts with very little to do."
Second, counterbalancing the judiciary's limitations is an array
of tools that courts have to help them amass and assimilate technical
information. The most common source of specialized knowledge in
American trials is expert testimony. Under the Federal Rules of
88. See id. at 68 ("[A]Ithough one in five [state court] judges hear these cases, they
do not hear very many and as a result, there appears to be a lack of procedures and
expertise for resolving them."). Professors Hafemeister and Robinson's study of the
judiciary estimates, however, that more than 7000 cases involving end-of-life decisions
have been heard by state courts. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Donna M. Robinson, The
Views of the Judiciary Regarding Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment Decisions, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 189, 190 n.8 (1994).
89. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1242-45
(3d Cir. 1983).
90. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (considering validity of EPA emissions standards for diesel engines); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (considering a challenge by the pulp paper
mill industry to EPA Clean Water Act regulations).
91. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1618-24 (1986); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that epidemiology studies are "the only useful studies having
any bearing on causation"), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
92. See James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some
Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding
Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619,623-27 (1984).
93. See Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233-35 (5th Cir. 1986);
Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.R.I. 1988) (stating that "this court found
itself confronted ... with issues of profound economic complexity" that warranted court
appointment of an economist as an expert), affd in relevant part, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir.
1988).
94. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 207 (1995)
("Conceding that [while] judges are not 'business experts,' neither are they experts in
medicine, engineering, product design or other areas of specialized knowledge that may
give rise to cognizable claims of negligence.").
95. See Edward V. DiLello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for
Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 474 (1993). In some cases
expert testimony has been criticized as far-fetched, unreliable, and lacking in objectivity.
See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510,512 (D. Md. 1973) (discussing unreliability
of expert testimony regarding polygraph tests); LEE COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR:
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Evidence, for example, courts may appoint their own experts." In
recent years, court-appointed experts have been used advantageously
in a range of cases involving technical testimony.' In addition, courts
may utilize special masters when "exceptional conditions" warrant
use of such individuals.98 Masters, who are usually practicing lawyers
or other professionals with special expertise in the subject matter of
the dispute, have appeared in virtually every type of dispute 9 and
perform a variety of tasks ranging from simple case management to
performing substantive judicial duties.' °  Where a "trial judge is
unfamiliar with the basic issues raised by a case," the court may invite
and consider amicus curiae briefs. 1' And finally, state court judges
PSYCHIATRY, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 45 (1984) (criticizing expert testimony as far-
fetched); FRANKLIN M. FISCHER Er AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. V. IBM 351 (1983) (suggesting that expert witnesses may
take on the point of view of attorneys with whom they work); Barry Tarlow, Admissibility
of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued
System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 924, 960-69, 974 (1975) (discussing unreliability of expert
testimony regarding polygraph tests).
96. See FED. R. EVID. 706.
97. See, e.g., Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 679-80, 684 (7th Cir.
1983) (finding that testimony by the court-appointed expert obviated the need for
testimony from the parties' experts).
98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). Although many of these cases will be heard in state
rather than federal court, most jurisdictions provide for a similar judicial option. See, e.g.,
TEX. R. CIv. P. 171 ("The court may ... appoint a master in chancery .... "). In Bouvia
v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), for instance, the trial
court appointed two independent physicians as special masters to assist in evaluating the
medical needs of a plaintiff suffering from severe cerebral palsy who sought to prohibit
county hospital physicians from withdrawing her morphine without her consent. See id. at
242.
99. See Vincent M. Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10
U. TOL. L. REv. 419, 421 (1979) (noting that special masters have been appointed in
actions involving antitrust violations, patent infringement, and eminent domain; and
recognizing that referrals have been made to masters in suits involving habeas corpus and
bankruptcy). In a recent example, eight special masters served in the Agent Orange
litigation. See Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131,2147 n.89 (1989).
100. See DiLello, supra note 95, at 486. In addition to court-appointed experts and
special masters, one reform proposal would provide for the creation of a new federal
office of judicial adjuncts who are specialists in technical fields, in order to facilitate
faster, more efficient, and less expensive adjudication of factual issues involving technical
evidence. See id. at 473-74.
101. Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 69. Professor Hafemeister cautioned that
the court should balance its informational needs against the need to arrive at a
prompt and decisive resolution of the matter, the need for a balanced
presentation of the issues, the need to maintain the integrity of the courtroom
and conformity to judicial procedures, and perhaps most importantly, the need
to respect the privacy and minimize the anguish of the parties who are directly
involved.
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may consult guidelines prepared by the National Center for State
Courts and the Coordinating Council on Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment Decision Making by the Courts (the "Court
Guidelines"),'0 which "identify and describe relevant issues ... and
serve as an information resource" in withdrawal of treatment cases103
Significantly, each of these methods provides the court with
accumulated expertise in medicine and end-of-life decisionmaking.'"
Third, and most important, many medical ethics issues are not
primarily issues of pure science, but rather involve normative
decisions in which medical science offers little help.105
2. Ethical Expertise
Courts have also been criticized because they are not ethical
experts." This criticism, too, is weak. Foremost, it is far from self-
evident what qualities contribute to good ethical decisionmaking.
Some of the strengths that philosophers identify as providing ethics
committees with a claim to special competence---for example, that
committees have training in "understanding logical arguments and
detecting fallacies" --are skills at which judges would appear
102. See NATIONAL CrR. FOR ST. CTS., GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION
MAKING IN LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES (2d ed. 1993).
103. Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 68.
104. Another possible tool for courts to use is full-time judicial adjuncts. However,
because end-of-life decisions occur infrequently and do not involve protracted litigation,
as in Agent Orange, there are fewer economies of scale to be achieved through the use of
a full-time judicial adjunct (unless of course the adjunct was given exclusive jurisdiction
over such decisions, much as the Court of Customs and Patent Disputes is given
jurisdiction over patent disputes). A clearinghouse approach, however, has practical
disadvantages. For example, it would increase the burden on families and health
professionals by requiring litigation of the dispute at some location other than the local
courthouse. As such, courts are more likely to rely on expert testimony or appoint a
special master or court-appointed expert in such cases.
105. As Dr. Avorn explained, when we consider ethical issues, "we have left the
domain of physiology and entered the realm of values." Jerry Avorn, A Physician's
Perspective, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1982, at 11, 12.
106. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (D.C. 1990) ("Because judgment in
... [life and death cases] involves complex ... ethical issues ... , we would urge the
establishment of another tribunal to make these decisions .... "); Hollander, supra note
36, at 171 (observing that medical ethics cases "involve complex issues, both medical and
social, that are better left to those with more expertise in the area").
107. Even assuming that moral philosophers and theologians may have a deeper
appreciation of the "leading [moral] theories and ... their bearing on specific issues,"
committees rarely are comprised entirely of such morally astute members. See Daniel
Wikler, Ethicists, Critics, and Expertise, HASTINGS CrR. REP., June 1982, at 12, 13; infra
note 166 and accompanying text.
108. Peter Singer, Ethics and Experts, HASTINGS CrR. REP., June 1982, at 9,9.
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equally adept. Moreover, because so much of evaluating the ethics of
a particular action entails "examin[ing] the legally possible options"
and "knowing when existing law needs to be determinative,"'" judges
would also appear to be inherently skilled at making these
determinations."'
More importantly, treatment decisions for incapacitated patients
rest not so much on particular reasoning abilities as they do on
normative judgments and assessments of factors not involved in
professional ethics training.m The normative judgments to be
made-primarily, what kind of life is worth living and from whose
perspective is the quality of life decision to be made-entail
philosophical and personal considerations that do not fall within the
sole province of those trained in ethics."' Many committee members,
moreover, have engaged in little or no formal study of clinical ethics
and maintain largely unexamined personal conceptions of medical
ethics."' Most judges can easily match this level of expertise."'
Similarly, there is nothing about committees that makes them
singularly suited to making the factual assessments required in such
cases. For example, a treatment decision for a newborn with
permanent physical or mental handicaps requires assessment of the
infant's
adaptability to his social environment, [which] depends not
only on what the child can do but on what others are willing
to do to adapt the environment to the child. This in turn
depends on intangibles, such as the acceptance of a child in
his home as well as on the quality of community resources
109. Russell L. McIntyre, The Legitimation of Ethics Consultation, TRENDS IN
HEALTH CARE, LAW & ETHICS, Fall 1993, at 7,9.
110. But see Wolf, supra note 38, at 287 ("[T]he committee operates in the domain of
morality, where 'rights' are only part of a complex vocabulary that includes 'needs' and
'wants,' where virtues exist besides rules, and theoretical controversy abounds.").
111. See Patrick A. Malone, Medical Authority and Infanticide, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 77,
105 (1985-86); see also Perlin, supra note 63, at 970 ("Because treatment choices are
'individualized,' physicians have no particular ability to determine whether, from the
patient's perspective, a treatment's hazards outweigh its benefits.").
112. In fact, these cases largely raise questions about whose values, and which values,
will enter into a determination of quality of life. See James F. Childress, Ethical Issues in
Jurisprudence-Ways to Analyze Them, in COLLOQUY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 85, at 7,
13 (making the same observation about optional versus obligatory treatment standards).
113. See Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 336; see also infra notes 161-69 and
accompanying text (discussing ethics committees' ethical expertise).
114. Indeed, ethicists concede that "the skills that philosophers have are not especially
esoteric. Anyone with reasonable intelligence and the time to read a few books and think
a bit can acquire them." Peter Singer, How Do We Decide? HASTINGS CTR. REP., June
1982, at 9,10.
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such as schools, physical therapy, and live-in institutions."5
A court may address each of these matters by taking expert
testimony, appointing a special master or expert in rehabilitative
care, inviting amicus briefs on the salient factual and ethical
questions, or consulting the Court Guidelines for assistance in
extrapolating and addressing the relevant factual and ethical issues.16
These treatment decisions, then, require factual assessments that a
court has the necessary resources and expertise to make. Moreover,
the decisions stand on normative assessments of what is valuable for
a particular patient, judgments for which neither a court nor a
committee is singularly qualified.
B. Cost, Timeliness, and Ability to Preserve Privacy
In addition to attacks on expertise, courts have been indicted for
"impos[ing] formidable costs on the family, in terms of money, time
expended, and psychological stress.""' 7 Upon closer examination,
these charges, too, appear exaggerated. We begin with an analysis of
the cost of litigating medical treatment disputes.
1. Cost
Without a doubt, representation in court by an attorney will
require greater expenditure of resources by the parties than dispute
resolution at the institutional level. However, most of the added cost
of court proceedings consists of attorney fees. This represents a fixed
additional cost over the cost of ethics-committee-dispute-resolution
only if one assumes that court proceedings require representation
while dispute resolutions by committees do not."'
Even where a cost differential exists, several devices exist to ease
the monetary burden on individual adjudicants. For example, court-
appointed counsel may be available to indigent patients.
Alternatively, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem or a
115. Malone, supra note 111, at 106.
116. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (outlining tools available to courts
to amass and assimilate technical information).
117. Scott, supra note 37, at 855.
118. The cost differential does not reflect the different cost of these proceedings, but
rather the cost of being represented versus not being represented. Conceivably, one
could retain and use an attorney to advocate one's interests before a committee-indeed,
this may be advisable where committees are granted immunity and privilege and thus
become, in most instances, the forum of last resort. Equally likely, an individual may
appear in court without representation, or may have counsel or a guardian appointed on
his behalf. See Hoffmann, supra note 8, at 839 n.78 (listing cases in which court appointed
a guardian for incapacitated patient).
[Vol. 76376
HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES
guardian for the patient when such an appointment is necessary to
protect the patient's interests.119
Notably, the cost differential may be more perceived than real.
In the related context of mandatory judicial review prior to forcible
medication in psychiatric hospitals, empirical studies have shown that
few patients actually refuse medication and, as a result, court
involvement does not unduly impair institutional resources.m
Because only a fraction of end-of-treatment cases will require judicial
review, one can expect that court hearings for these cases will
require only a small outlay of money and court resources over time.
A less obvious disadvantage of judicial review is that the public
bears the cost of the proceeding in the form of taxes to maintain
courts:" Such cases "often entail a sizeable outlay of judicial
resources ... [as they] often require[] emergency hearings, expedited
proceedings, [and] attempts to appoint a guardian ad litem."' In
contrast, when institutions resolve these cases through the use of
ethics committees, the institution, not taxpayers, supports the cost of
dispute resolution.
119. See Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 70. In a recent survey, 70.8% of judges
indicated that none of the parties in life-sustaining decisionmaking cases had been
financially burdened. See Hafemeister & Robinson, supra note 88, at 202.
120. See Perlin, supra note 63, at 973. Empirical studies of judicial review prior to
forced medication have found that only a tiny percentage went to court: 1.3% of the
involuntary patients and 0.6% of the total population. See Julie Magno Zito et al., One
Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 295, 298, 302 (1989); see also Donald J. Kemna, Current Status of
Institutionalized Mental Health Patients' Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL
MED. 107, 119 (1985) (finding that implementation of due process procedures has cost
little and has resulted in unexpected savings). Concededly, these data are not definitive:
it may be that few patients refuse medications precisely because of the prohibitive cost of
litigating the need for medication.
121. See Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 67 (observing that legal disputes involving end-
of-life decisions arise on average only once every 6 1/2 years). In contrast, a survey
commissioned by the American Association of Critical-Care Nurses ("AACN") found
that 65% of critical care nurses "participate in decisions about withdrawing or
withholding life support at least several times each month, with 24 percent taking part in
such discussions at least several times each week." AACN, Frequent Life Support
Decisions Confirm Expertise of Critical Care Nursing, Survey Reveals 1 (May 23, 1990)
(press release) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
122. Sigrid Fry-Revere identifies this public burden as a disadvantage to any form of
government regulation that is to be carried out effectively. See FRY-REVERE, supra note
58, at 45; cf. Hafemeister & Robinson, supra, note 88, at 202 (reporting that a minority of
judges found medical ethics proceedings expensive only for the state rather than the
parties).
123. Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 68.
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2. Timeliness
The Court Guidelines noted above recognize that "unnecessary
delay ... engender[s] injustice and hardship" and therefore the court
response to a life sustaining medical treatment question must be
"timely and expeditious." 4 To accommodate the need for a timely
response, the Court Guidelines suggest that judges "establish early
control over an [end-of-treatment] case... and... tak[e] appropriate
steps to expedite the case."' 2' Moreover, a court should retain
jurisdiction over a case following the issuance of its orders so that it
may respond quickly if a disgruntled party takes steps to block or
delay implementation of the court's order.1" Collectively, these
mechanisms provide some comfort that end-of-treatment decisions
can be adjudicated in a timely fashion.
3. Ability to Preserve Privacy
While the ability to preserve privacy may appear to be a genuine
drawback of judicial proceedings, the problem is easily solved. As
one federal judge noted in the context of peer review litigation,
disclosure of committee records need not intrude on patient privacy
since anonymity can be preserved through protective orders." A
recent survey of the judiciary indicates that in rare situations judges
have closed hearings to the public, sealed records of the court
proceedings, taken testimony in camera, and referred to parties by
initials or pseudonyms.'
C. Objectivity
Added to criticisms of the courts as unwieldy, intrusive, and
costly are charges that some bias exists in judicial review of end-of-
life cases. As before, a principled examination of this charge
suggests, on balance, otherwise. This Article begins an examination
of the objectivity of courts by canvassing studies asserting that
124. Id. at 69 (discussing the Court Guidelines for medical ethics disputes).
125. Id. at 68-69. Judges have used a number of unusual procedures to expedite these
sorts of cases-ex parte hearings, hearings via conference call, bedside visits, after-hours
sessions, and out-of-court hearings, as well as accelerated scheduling and decisionmaking.
See Hafemeister & Robinson, supra note 88, at 209. Few judges have found
expeditiousness to be a problem. See id. at 207. But see id. at 210 (providing anecdotal
evidence that parties may find a delay of hours excessive and painful).
126. See Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 73.
127. See Robinson v. McGovern, 83 F.R.D. 79, 89-92 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (discussing
confidentiality of peer review records).
128. See Hafemeister & Robinson, supra note 88, at 203-04,212.
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judicial decisions in medical ethics cases are biased.
A study by Professors Miles and August of twenty-two state
appellate court decisions concerning withholding or withdrawal of
treatment for incompetent patients observed asymmetric gender-
patterned reasoning within the cases." Specifically, courts tended to
view a man's prior wishes as rational and a woman's prior remarks as
unreflective, emotional, childlike, and immature when the same
evidence existed in both cases for the rationality of the decision.' As
a result of this gender-based treatment by courts, "women are
disadvantaged in having their moral agency taken less seriously than
that of men." '
Equally disturbing, courts considering end-of-life treatments
almost invariably authorize decisions resulting in death rather than
sustaining life. ' Demonstrating this, Justice Stevens in his Cruzan
dissent laid out an "unbroken stream of cases" authorizing cessation
of treatment when the patient was in a vegetative state.' While
distressing, these studies fail to tell the whole story. Balanced against
these shortcomings, court proceedings promote objectivity by
ensuring that all relevant parties have notice and an opportunity to
be heard.1 The Court Guidelines described earlier stress that the
court's primary concern is to "ensure that the patient's views are
heard, if at all possible."'1 s This may be accomplished by allowing the
patient "to testify in chambers ... [or] from his or her hospital bed
via telephone,... holding court in settings other than the courthouse
or taking steps to insure the proceedings are recorded so that they
can be subsequently reviewed by a non-attending patient. "r Other
individuals who should be joined as parties or subpoenaed as
witnesses include anyone with a direct familiarity with (a) the
patient's wishes, (b) the care or treatment provided, or (c) the
129. See Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and the "Right to Die," 18
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 85,88,92 (1990).
130. See id. at 88.
131. Id. at 92.
132. See Flick, supra note 53, at 1132 n.42,1166 n.164.
133. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 348 & n.21 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting from majority opinion holding that Nancy Cruzan's
parents lacked decisionmaking authority to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn).
As Justice Stevens noted, Cruzan is an exception to this pattern. See id. at 349 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
134. See Hollander, supra note 36, at 170-71 ("Arguably, the ultimate decision-making
responsibility should not be shifted away from the courts, which presumably provide a
detached but searching investigation in deciding such questions of life and death.").
135. Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 69.
136. Id. at 70.
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qualifications of the patient's putative representative.137 This list is
exhaustive and one that clearly exceeds that used by the majority of
ethics committees.m Beyond mere notice and an opportunity to be
heard, the judicial system offers parties the opportunity to appeal a
decision to a second neutral body for reconsideration.
More importantly, the court can-and should-hold formal
adversarial hearings to resolve the matter before it. Although the
antagonistic nature of court proceedings heightens participants'
discomfort, such a "hearing should ... allow the court to reach an
independent determination and not merely to ratify a decision
reached by others." '139 Thus, the adversarial process itself, together
with the procedural protections described above, should lead to
principled and impartial decisions reflecting a full exposition of the
issues."
Finally, court proceedings promote objectivity simply because
the decisions are "made by an independent arbitrator such as a
federal court (aided by an impartial guardian or custodian). 14. This
allows courts to "stand guard against treatment decisions improperly
motivated by the financial concerns of a family or institution,
disagreements between family members or family and physicians, or
medical professionals acting in their own interest, rather than the
patient's [interest].
1 42
137. See id. at 69.
138. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (explaining that committees often
make decisions behind closed doors without providing notice to patient or decisionmaker
or following standards of due process).
139. Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 70; cf. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at
159 (stating that the adversarial process encourages full exposition of the issues). But see
Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) ("Common human experience and scholarly
opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine
the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental
and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real.").
140. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 159 (reviewing the positives and
negatives of judicial review); cf Hollander, supra note 36, at 171 (maintaining that courts
are able to provide an impartial decisionmaking process but questioning whether courts
are the proper forum).
141. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479,499 (4th Cir. 1987), on reh'g, 863 F.2d 302
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
142. Beth Schermer, A Practical Guide for Hospital Counsel in Decisions to Withhold
or Withdraw Medical Treatment, 23 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 264, 264 (1990); see also
Charters, 829 F.2d at 499 & n.28 (noting that mandatory judicial review prior to forcible
medication in psychiatric hospitals circumvents decisions designed to benefit an
institution, such as those easing its institutional budget).
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D. Error Costs Associated with Court Decisions
Courts have rejected mandatory judicial review in a number of
contexts, stressing that institutional review incurs fewer error costs
than judicial decisionmaking by non-expert judges. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected a mental patient's
claim that his competency to make an informed judgment to accept
or reject medication must be determined by a neutral fact-finder
because the court was not convinced that giving this determination to
"non-specialist judges ... offers a better protection against error than
would leaving it... to responsible medical professionals."'
This conclusion that courts do not add to the diagnostic work of
mental health professionals has been roundly criticized, largely on
the grounds that a significant number of mental hospitals, unpoliced,
have engaged in patterns and practices of serious misuse of
psychotropic drugs.' 44 Error costs, then, are a function of the relative
expertise of courts and ethics committees to make end-of-treatment
decisions, and the ability of each to decide impartially and without a
conflict of interest. These matters are addressed in other sections.45
E. Capacity to Treat Like Cases Alike
Several features of the legal system promote fundamental
fairness and equality in treatment among cases. First, courts must
respect the principle of stare decisis, which places a high burden on
143. Charters, 863 F.2d at 311. The Fourth Circuit also concluded that the threat of
side effects "can better be assessed and reviewed [intra-institutionally] than by an
adversarial adjudicative process." Id.; see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (D.C.
App. 1990) ("Because judgment in ... [life and death cases] involves complex medical
and ethical issues as well as the application of legal principles, we would urge the
establishment.., of another tribunal to make these decisions .... ).
144. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1302 (D.N.J. 1979), modified,
635 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). At trial, one expert
testified that psychotropic drugs were the "be all and end all" of state psychiatric
hospitals, and in an office memo the defendant-state-hospital-medical-director conceded
that medication was used "as a form of control and as a substitute for treatment." Id. at
1299. The record also established that hospital physicians regularly failed to diagnose
tardive dyskinesia and other neurological side effects present in one third to one half of
all state hospital patients, and "unjustified polypharmacy" was common. Id.; see also
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1980) ("[T]estimony at trial
established that the prevalent use of psychotropic drugs is countertherapeutic and can be
justified only for reasons other than treatment-namely, for the convenience of staff and
for punishment.").
145. See supra notes 82-116 and 129-42 and accompanying text (discussing capacity of
courts to decide cases correctly and impartially); infra notes 160-69 and 181-99 and
accompanying text (discussing capacity of committees to decide cases correctly and
impartially).
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courts to justify their departure from existing case law.'46 Second,
because decisions have precedential value and bind courts within a
single jurisdiction, different courts in that jurisdiction handle
substantially similar cases in a roughly uniform manner. Third,
Supreme Court review resolves some conflicts in treatment among
jurisdictions, introducing horizontal uniformity among the federal
circuits or the state courts.
Of course, our federalist system tolerates some inconsistency in
state law on many fundamental issues, such as the death penalty and
abortion, a phenomenon Professor Dworkin labels "checkerboard
justice."'147 For example, the Supreme Court rested its decision on
federalism concerns in affirming the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision that Nancy Cruzan's parents lacked authority to effectuate a
request to withdraw life support.' As Justice O'Connor explained,
because "no national consensus has yet emerged on the best solution
for this difficult and sensitive problem [of the right to refuse medical
treatment,] ... the more challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is
entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States."'4
As Professor Dworkin observes, it is constitutionally acceptable
and inherently fair for individual states to provide different degrees of
protection for individual rights as long as the states do not make
arbitrary distinctions among their citizens as to who will have their
rights protected."" Professor Dworkin explains society's acceptance
of some degree of inconsistency among states by pointing to the
importance we place on political integrity-our sense that citizens of
a given community should share rights and obligations equally:'
"[Integrity] requires government to speak with one voice, to
act in a principled and coherent manner toward all its
citizens, to extend to everyone the substantive standards of
justice or fairness it uses for some.... [Integrity requires a]
146. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992); Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); BLACK'S LAW DIcrONARY 978 (6th ed. 1991)
(establishing stare decisis as a court policy to follow precedent and not disturb settled
law).
147. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 184-86 (1986). Difference among state laws
is not the only inconsistency tolerated in the United States. Differences occur from
municipality to municipality as well.
148. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,285-87 (1990).
149. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. See DWORKIN, supra note 147, at 164-65; FRY-REVERE, supra note 58, at 19-23.
151. See DWORKIN, supra note 147, at 164-65; FRY-REVERE, supra note 58, at 19-23.
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state to act on a single, coherent set of principles even when
its citizens are divided about what the right principles of
justice and fairness really are .... 152
Consequently, legal scholars are not disturbed that Mississippi
makes different evidentiary requirements of surrogate
decisionmakers than, say, Virginia. Scholars would oppose, however,
Mississippi judges' requiring one Mississippi citizen to demonstrate
with clear and convincing evidence the wishes of a patient, while
allowing a second ississippian to act as surrogate by showing only
that a patient's wishes more probably than not included the desire to
withdraw treatment."' According to Professor Dworkin, then, a
federal system can be fair without requiring all states to treat their
citizens as every other state does, as long as each state treats each of
its similarly situated citizens equally."A
Notwithstanding the prevailing acceptance of a federalist system,
to the extent that end-of-life cases involve decisions that skilled
judges are unable, among themselves, to make with consistent
outcomes, judicial review of these cases may undermine public
confidence in the courts. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained with respect to determinations of mental competence:
To suppose that [the difference in two mental states] is a
distinction that can be fairly discerned and applied by even
the most skilled judges on the basis of an adversarial fact-
finding proceeding taxes credulity. The resulting threat of
wholly inconsistent or highly anomalous adjudications is
palpable, and poses high risks to the integrity and
trustworthiness of the courts' already perilous
involvement-out of necessity-in the adjudication of
complex states of mental pathology. 5
However, to emphasize the risks of flatly inconsistent
determinations by different judicial tribunals is, to some extent, to
beg the question. The relevant determination is whether such risks
152. FRY-REVERE, supra note 58, at 20 (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 147, at 165-66,
but omitting paragraph break between sentences and brackets around "to" in "state to
act").
153. See DWORKIN, supra note 147. at 185. Another example of a conceivably fair,
but nevertheless unacceptable, practice is a proposal allowing abortions only for women
born in even years. See id Fry-Revere suggests that handing out alternating life
imprisonment and death sentences to persons guilty of the same crime would be another
example. See FRY-REVERE, supra note 58, at 20.
154. See DWORKIN, supra note 147, at 185.
155. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
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are unavoidable, an inference that is affected in part by the
comparative ability of ethics committees to make consistent decisions
without sacrificing the protections afforded patients through judicial
review. We turn now to this question.
III. EXAMINING THE UNDERLYING PREMISE: ETHICS COMMITTEES
AS DECISIONMAKERS
Having examined the ability of the courts to comprehend the
medical and ethical complexity of treatment controversies"' and to
dispatch these cases in a timely fashion," at a bearable cost,", and in
an objective, fair manner,"7 we now measure ethics committees
against these same yardsticks. As before, we begin this exploration
with the expertise of ethics committees.
A. The Committees' Expertise
Like the technical expertise of the judiciary, we can dissect an
ethics committee's decisiomnaking ability into medical expertise and
ethical expertise. As with examination of the judiciary's expertise,
we begin first with a look at the medical expertise of ethics
committees.
1. Medical Expertise
With respect to clinical knowledge, committee members may be
at no more advantage than the judiciary. Professor Ross notes that
"clinical ethics consultants (usually neither physicians nor nurses) ...
may ultimately become very knowledgeable about medicine, but they
are always dependent upon their 'students' [the institution's
healthcare personnel] to provide and assess the medical facts that
must be judged before ethical analysis can proceed." '' Unlike courts,
however, committees do not command the resources to procure an
extra-institutional-professional appraisal of the medical facts.
2. Ethical Expertise
The ethical expertise ascribed to ethics committees" hinges
156. See supra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 129-55 and accompanying text.
160. Judith Wilson Ross, Commentary: Why Clinical Ethics Consultants Might Not
Want to Be Educators, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 445,446 (1993).
161. See Hollander, supra note 36, at 171 (arguing that treatment disputes "involve
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largely on the expertise that member ethicists can bring to an ethical
dilemma. "The ethicist brings knowledge of a process of moral
reasoning and relevant literature which he or she is now asked to use
to analyze a case and to recommend an appropriate course of
action.... [The ethicist can] guid[e] the discussion and thereby
instruct those involved concerning the values of the case and the
justification of various courses of action .. .. ,162 Although individual
ethicists indeed may possess developed moral reasoning skills, "the
'expertise' of ethics committees is far from obvious. ' 1  As a threshold
matter, ethicists are included in the ranks of less than one half of
ethics committees." Moreover, on those committees where ethicists
serve, they "are not thought to be very influential, especially by
physicians."" It may be expected, then, that any moral expertise
ethicists bring to committee proceedings may be dampened by a
credibility gap among physicians and other committee members.
Moreover, Professors Fletcher and Hoffmann note that "most
members of ethics committees engage in little or no serious study of
clinical ethics or related topics. In practice, each member tends to
maintain his or her own personal concept of ethics, which is rarely
examined in serious debate."" Experience aside, Professor Ross
emphasizes that the notion of the ethics committee as an ethics
expert may be incompatible with and may misrepresent the role of
the committee in the patient care context."' Scholars have not even
agreed on the appropriate qualifications that committee members
complex [ethical] issues ... that are better left to... [ethics committees which have] more
expertise in the area" than the courts).
162. Jacqueline Glover et al., Teaching Ethics on Rounds: The Ethicist as Teacher,
Consultan4 and Decision Maker, 7 THEORETICAL MED. 13, 15-16 (1986); see also Wikler,
supra note 107, at 12, 13 ("Knowledge of the leading theories and skill in determining
their bearing on specific issues is one basis for claims of expertise in applied ethics .....
163. Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 323 (emphasis added).
164. See Hoffman, supra note 39, at 108 (reporting results of regional study of medical
ethics committees).
165. Id. at 117.
166. Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 336; see also Susan M. Wolf, Ethics
Committees in the Courts, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1986, at 12, 14 ("[E]thics
committees should not be presumed to have [moral] expertise meriting deference ....
[M]ost members probably have had no formal training in moral reasoning. Their
collective opinion adds only the element of consensus. Yet consensus does not mean that
the group has reasoned rigorously or well; it simply means that the members agree.").
Admittedly, the same may be said of individual members of the judiciary.
167. See Ross ET AL., supra note 20, at 32-33 (noting the possible use of ethics
committees for issues involving impaired staff members and conflicts caused by religious
philosophy or physician's joint ventures). Ross also emphasizes that ethics committee
members are not ethical specialists but should be "thoughtful, reflective, critical
thinkers." Id. at 37.
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should possess."68 And, to the extent that committee consult services
reflect traditional medical decisionmaking, the "individualized, ad
hoc character [of individual case resolution may be] ... ill-suited to
address the broader ethical issues implicated in modem medicine." '69
B. Cost, Timeliness, and Ability to Preserve Privacy
The second measure of ethics committees as decisionmakers is
their ability to resolve treatment controversies in a cost-effective,
timely fashion while preserving the privacy of the proceeding."' As
with this Article's analysis of the judicial proceedings, this study
begins with a review of the costs of ethics committee decisionmaking.
1. Cost
It is likely that review by an ethics committee of individual cases
will cost less than judicial review, incurring neither court costs nor
attorneys fees. The cost of review per case is only part of the
picture, however. We must also look at the propensity for the
volume of such cases to grow as the bureaucracy to accommodate
it-ethics committees-is put in place. Thus, if the use of ethics
committees results in the routine review of" 'an even larger number
and wider range of medical decisions' than would have been reviewed
in court proceedings,"' this mechanism of review may be more
costly in the aggregate.'
168. See Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 336 ("[L]ittle consensus exists about
standards for education and skills necessary for membership on a committee, or for the
internal operations of committees, for providing consultation as a committee member, or
for procedural guidelines for the conduct of consultations."); Giles R. Scofield, Ethics
Consultation" The Least Dangerous Profession?, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHIcs 417, 419 (1993) ("Ethicists themselves do not agree on how ethics should be
taught or on whether [ethicists] should reason analytically, causistically [sic], or
phenomenologically."); see also Wolf, supra note 38, at 287 (noting that committees have
enormous variation in ethical expertise).
169. Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1523-24 (1990).
170. For analysis of the courts' ability to meet these needs, see supra notes 117-28 and
accompanying text.
171. See Scott, supra note 37, at 855-56 (noting that judicial review imposes formidable
costs, including attorneys fees, court costs, and time away from work).
172. Mary Layne Ahern, Biomedical Ethics Committees Confront Prickly Issues,
HOSPITALS, Aug. 1, 1984, at 66, 68 (1984) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra
note 4, at 165).
173. As noted above, very few end-of-life treatment decisions require judicial review.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (reporting that state court judges encounter
treatment disputes only once every six or more years). In contrast, many ethics
committees hear a dozen or more cases per month. See Wilson et al., supra note 6
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Moreover, per capita cost of ethics committee deliberations is
misleading not only because it fails to account for volume increases,
but also because it fails to account for duplication of efforts and costs.
If judicial oversight of treatment controversies occurs as frequently
when there has been prior institutional review as when there has not,
then the tab for ethics committee review does not substitute for court
costs but is tacked onto those costs. The President's Commission
acknowledged this risk in strong cautionary language:
If the existing process of decision-making, which is largely
private and unreviewed, has been appropriate and has
resulted in good decisions that are in the aggregate as
"good" as those arrived at by an ethics committee, then
creating committees will complicate the total process, not
improve it.'
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a significant advantage of using ethics
committees to resolve disputes is that the institution bears the cost of
the proceeding, rather than taxpayers.' 5
2. Timeliness
Timeliness of dispute resolution is one area in which ethics
committees, as institutional actors functioning at the bedside, have
the clear advantage over redress to the courts. In a two-year study of
an ethics consultation service in a community teaching hospital, "[a]l
respondents found that the consultation was provided quickly
enough."'76 The ethics consultation service at a large tertiary care
hospital, for instance, experienced average initial response time of
two to three minutes for a request for consultation and several hours
to a couple of days or longer for a formal consultation.' Few courts,
if any, can boast such prompt turn-around times.
The superiority of committees in preserving patient
confidentiality is less clear, an issue to which we turn now.
3. Ability to Preserve Privacy
Several problems raise serious doubts about a committee's
(unpublished data on file with the author).
174. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 165.
175. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing costs to the public of
judicial proceedings).
176. John LaPuma et al., Community Hospital Ethics Consultation: Evaluation and
Comparison with a University Hospital Service, 92 AM. J. MED. 346,348 (1992).
177. Telephone Interview with John C. Fletcher, Ph.D., Former Director, Center for
Biomedical Ethics, University of Virginia Medical Center Bioethics Committee (Oct. 16,
1997).
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capacity to preserve privacy. First, a "patient's charts are easily
obtained by consultants whose participation in care is unknown to
the patient."'7 Second, studies have shown that more than eighty
individuals can make credible claims of access to a patient's clinical
chart during an average stay."" Third, a committee, unlike a court,
has no legal authority to direct either its own members or those
caretakers utilizing committee services to maintain a patient's
confidentiality."'
C. Objectivity
While an ethics committee, as an institutional player in the
treatment setting, may be better able to gauge its impact on family
members and proceed in a fashion that causes the least amount of
strain,'8' the advantages of such proximity are not without their costs.
Several aspects of committee performance suggest that one such cost
is compromised objectivity." First, ethics committees wholly or in
part may conceive of their role as serving physicians," suggesting
that objectivity is an unrealistic expectation. Even when the
committee sees its purpose as being an impartial arbiter, the
committee may be concerned about preserving its place in the
institution by decreasing physician anxiety about its role and
authority.""
Second, an ethics committee may internalize and perpetuate its
parent hospital's dominant institutional biases.' This risk seems real
178. Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 336.
179. See id. Of course, this jeopardizes a person's privacy with respect to ethical
matters only if the committee or consultant records notes of the ethics consultation in the
patient's chart.
180. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of protective
orders issued by courts.
181. See Scott, supra note 37, at 855 (observing that mandatory judicial review
"impose[s] formidable costs on the family, in terms of money, time expended, and
psychological stress").
182. It is critical to any examination of objectivity that we decide from whose
perspective a proceeding must be objective. Because fundamental liberty interests are
often involved in medical ethical questions, see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 278-79, 292 (1990), the patient's interest should be our starting point. As
Professor Merritt points out, such a presumption "accords with the overriding goal of
medicine-to further the patient's interest-and with the role that most advocates of
ethics committees envision the committee as serving." Merritt, supra note 5, at 1273.
183. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
184. See Cranford & Doudera, supra note 3, at 11 ("A multidisciplinary ethics
committee could help health care practitioners feel more secure about the
appropriateness of their decisions and help assure patients of their rights.").
185. See Leslie Steven Rothenberg, Clinical Ethicists and Hospital Ethics Consultants:
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given that most ethics committee members are institutional actors,"
the majority of committees are chaired by physician-members," the
ethics committee literature is replete with advice to committees not
to be reformers," and the dynamics of group decisionmaking may
inadvertently cause committees to avoid controversial issues or
alternatives that prevent quick agreement.8 9 As Professor Scofield
tersely points out, "[o]ne need only ask who hires them, who they are
accountable to, and what group they wish least to offend to
appreciate how easily ethics consultants can lose the critical distance
needed to exercise ... independent, objective judgment."'' Indeed,
extensive patient involvement in committee deliberations "may not
reassure patients that their wishes and interests are represented....
Patients or surrogates who disagree with the committee's
The Nature of Their "Clinical" Role, in ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE 19, 27
(John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter ETICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH
CARE] (suggesting that "hospital-based philosophers might become absorbed 'into the
medical center ethos and become collaborators in a flawed system'" (quoting William
Ruddick, Can Doctors and Philosophers Work Together?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Apr.
1981, at 12, 17)). An institutional bias that may be perpetuated by ethics committees may
be the desire by "[d]octors ... to make all the choices." ROTHMAN, supra note 37, at 209;
see also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (describing
physicians' ambivalence about surrendering their traditional domination of the decisional
process). An ethics committee may perpetuate this bias by giving greater deference to
physicians than other healthcare professionals. See ROTHMAN, supra note 37, at 256 ("To
the degree that ... [ethics committees] are doctor-convened, they may be doctor-
dominated."); Hoffmann, supra note 39, at 111 (reporting that 60% of survey respondents
in a regional ethics committee study found physicians most likely to influence the
outcome of an ethics committee's recommendation). Concededly, the judiciary also runs
the risk of perpetuating institutional biases. See supra notes 129-33 (discussing possible
biases in judicial decisionmaking in the healthcare context).
186. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 37, at 255
("Membership [on medical ethics committees] is heavily weighted to clinical personnel
.... "); Hoffmann, supra note 39, at 108, 116-17 (reporting that a regional descriptive
study of ethics committees in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia found
100% of committees contained at least one physician, 98% contained at least one nurse,
90% contained at least one social worker, and 80% contained at least one hospital
administrator, with physician representation on such committees far outstripping
representation by any other group).
187. See Hoffmann, supra note 39, at 108 (reporting that in the majority of
jurisdictions surveyed physicians most often chaired the committees).
188. See Mark Siegler, Cautionary Advice for Humanists, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Apr.
1981, at 19, 19-20; see also Ronald E. Cranford & David L. Jackson, Neurologists and the
Hospital Ethics Committee, 4 SEMINARS NEUROLOGY 15, 19 (1984) (assuaging doctors'
fears that ethics committees will infringe on the "traditional decision-making prerogative
of physicians" by emphasizing the limited powers of ethics committees to act in a
"consultative, informative, and advisory capacity").
189. See Bernard Lo, Behind Closed Doors: Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics
Committees, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 46,48 (1987).
190. Scofield, supra note 168, at 420.
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recommendations may say that the composition of the committee
was biased against them..191
Compounding this risk of capture by the institution is the
prevalent confusion about the proper purpose of an ethics
committee.1" While numerous authors argue that patient protection
should be the primary purpose of ethics committees,1" others at least
conceive of risk management or the protection of institutional
interests as a valid committee objective."9' Equally as troubling as
191. See Lo, supra note 189, at 47.
192. This confusion over purpose continues to dominate the discussion of medical
ethics issues. See Judith Wilson Ross, The AMA Talks Medical Ethics, VITAL SIGNS:
BIoETHICs NEWS & REVS., May 1997 (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http'//www.chee.orgvital.htn> (discussing positions taken in panel discussion by
philosopher Robert Veatch, attorney Alex Capron, and physician Mark Siegler on the
question of: "Who Should Control the Scope and Nature of Medical Ethics?").
193. See Capron, supra note 4, at 429; Ruth Macklin, Consultative Roles and
Responsibilities, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 157; Veatch,
supra note 6, at 35; see also George J. Annas, Ethics Committees in Neonatal Care:
Substantive Protection or Procedural Diversion?, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 843, 843-44
(1984) (stating that although institutions often see the primary function of ethics
committees as protecting their legal liability, "[t]he much more important potential
function of ethics committees is the protection of the autonomy and dignity of individual
patients"); Mila Ann Aroskar, Considerations in Establishing an Ethics Committee, 40
ASS'N OPERATING ROOM NURSES J. 88, 92 (1984) ("Institutional ethics committees have
the potential for protecting patients' interests and welfare and assuring that reasoned, fair
decisions are made for those unable to decide for themselves."); Robert M. Kliegman et
al., In Our Best Interests: Experience and Workings of an Ethics Review Committee, 108 J.
PEDIATRICS 178, 186 (1986) (noting that committees' goals should be "to promote the
best interests of patients"); Judith Randal, Are Ethics Committees Alive and Well?,
HASTINGS CrR. REP., Dec. 1983, at 10, 12 (characterizing the role of ethics committees as
that of patient advocate).
194. See John A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures
and Responsibilities, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITrEES, supra note 3, at 85, 88-89
(noting the potential use of an ethics committee as an "ethical risk management team");
Annas, supra note 193, at 843-44 ("Institutions and their staffs often see the primary
function of ethics committees as protecting them against potential legal liability for
treating or not treating particular patients.... This is a legitimate institutional goal, but
such committees should probably be termed 'risk management' or 'liability control'
committees instead of ethics committees."); Capron, supra note 4, at 429 ("[S]ome people
... favor ethics committees in the belief that they will protect physicians or hospitals.");
Norman Fost & Ronald E. Cranford, Hospital Ethics Committees, 253 JAMA 2687, 2689
(1985) ("If the primary function of the group is to be advisory to the attending physician,
apologies should not be needed for the physician's desire to have a free and uninhibited
consultation.").
This concern that the ethics committee will act as a risk management team is
heightened by the inclusion on nearly all committees of hospital administrators and in-
house counsel, both of whom have probable conflicts of interest. See ROSS ET AL., supra
note 20, at 39 (observing that "insofar as, in some cases, the hospital's interests (in
avoiding possible law suits, for example) may not in the short run be consistent with the
patient's desires or interests, the hospital lawyer should not to [sic] be placed in a position
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committees that openly serve institutional interests are ethics
committees that possess a "double identity," in which they advise
patients and serve caregivers.19' Such a conflicting role robs patients
of the ability to know "precisely where they stand" vis-a-vis the
committee.
Third, few committees have put in place the process protections
that would help to combat institutional bias. As Professors Fletcher
and Hoffmann note:
[C]ommittees, which are confused about their advisory role,
make decisions "behind closed doors" at the request of
clinicians who approach the committee without notifying
the patient or surrogate decision makers. Standards of due
process are not followed and may even be unknown to the
committee. Inattention to procedural due process raises
concerns that the rights of caregivers, patients, and patients'
families are possibly being compromised or violated.196
The due process protections afforded by judicial review but
lacking in committee proceedings include uniform procedural
guidelines, notification to all involved parties of a hearing, an appeal
process, and the mandatory inclusion of an advocate for the patient's
of possible conflict of interest"); Daniel Wikler, Institutional Agendas and Ethics
Committees, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 21, 22 (asserting that
administrators may "loo[k] to avoid ... fight[s]" and seek "narrow institutional gains,
rather than success in meeting community needs"). A 1992 national survey, conducted
with the assistance of the American Hospital Association, found that 96.2% of all ethics
committees contain at least one administrator. See Wilson et al., supra note 6
(unpublished data on file with the author). This figure has almost doubled since the mid-
1980s. See Gregory A. Jaffe, Institutional Ethics Committees: Legitimate and Impartial
Review of Ethical Health Care Decisions, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 393,413 (1989).
Professor Ackerman identifies a third conception of the committee's role that rejects
a patient-centered focus for "an impartial analysis of the competing moral interests of
other relevant parties." Terrence F. Ackerman, Conceptualizing the Role of the Ethics
Consultant Some Theoretical Issues, in ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE, supra
note 185, at 37, 42. This, too, greatly impacts the ability of a committee to act objectively
on the patient's behalf.
195. See Wolf, supra note 7, at 820-31. This duality of purpose largely arises from the
failure to articulate clearly a committee's mission and goals. As Merritt points out, "[i]t is
unlikely that many committees identify whether their primary constituency is doctors or
patients. Indeed, few of the participants may consciously think in advance of defining
their roles in these terms." Merritt, supra note 5, at 1292. Physician committee members
and physicians who consult with a committee, moreover, may be hobbled in achieving a
"shared [decisionmaking] process [with the patient] marked by conversation and patient
choice" by the "profound ambivalence among physicians about surrendering their
traditional domination of the decisional process." Wolf, supra note 8, at 829-30 (citing
JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD oFDOCrOR AND PATIENT 98-100 (1984)).
196. Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 336 (footnote omitted).
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interests.'" Until committees institute minimal process protections
for patients and users, committee functions lack even a semblance of
order and fairness and threaten to reach arbitrary and disparate
outcomes.
Lastly, feminist scholars have argued that ethicists, like courts,
may have integrated stereotypical perspectives into their work,
perpetuating gender bias.198 Other scholars suggest that "ethics [may]
perpetuate the domination of some groups and individuals by
others."'99
D. Error Costs Associated with Committee Decisions
As late as 1991, some two decades into the ethics committee
movement, ethics committee "insiders" first began to give serious
consideration "to develop[ing] a common understanding of success-
of defensible results-if we are to judge whether our assumptions
about [ethics committee] processes and structures are correct. ' '
Impeding the development of uniform standards, however, is the fear
that such standards, like standards for physicians and other
healthcare professionals, may expose committees and their members
to liability!" Although a lack of agreed-upon standards may be
expected in a movement still in its infancy, without even rudimentary
agreement on the recommendations committees should make in
particular situations, it should also be expected that
recommendations will vary widely, and perhaps materially, from
committee to committee.
Compounding the lack of uniform standards is the dramatically
uneven professional qualifications of ethics committee members."
197. See Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 779-80 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra
note 4, at 446); Lo, supra note 189, at 47; Wolf, supra note 7, at 803.
198. See generally ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988) (arguing that the caring perspective attributed
to women fails to represent the diverse experiential perspectives of women); Marla C.
Lugones & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Have We Got a Theory for Youl Feminist Theory,
Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for 'The Woman's Voice,' 6 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L
F. 573 (1983) (arguing that gender and race are pervasive elements in every individual's
thinking and outlook).
199. Scofield, supra note 168, at 419 (citing SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT:
FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE (1992)).
200. Gail M. Povar, Evaluating Ethics Committees: What Do We Mean by Success?, 50
MD. L. REv. 904,907 (1991).
201. See Carol Levine, Hospital Ethics Committees: A Guarded Prognosis, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., June 1977, at 26,26.
202. See Wolf, supra note 38, at 287 (noting that committee members have enormous
variation in ethical expertise).
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Calling for an end to the "era of laissez-faire in ethics consultation,"
Professor Fletcher has chided hospitals to "exercise more control
over who is authorized to provide ethics consultation." 3 The lack of
control over professional qualifications and accountability standards,
Professor Fletcher argues, "encourage[s] ethics disasters. It is
surprising that in only the Bouvia case was a committee ... accused
of 'ethics malpractice' and sued."' As Professor Jim Ellis observed
in his testimony on ethics committees before the United States Civil
Rights Commission in its hearings on the 1984 Child Abuse
Amendments, "to place all of our civil rights enforcement resources
[or more broadly, patient protection resources] in such a hit-or-miss
mechanism when the stakes are so high for the [patients] involved is
distressing. '
E. Capacity to Treat Like Cases Alike
As noted above, the movement's near utter lack of process
protections for patients and users suggests that committees cannot
guarantee fundamental fairness and equality in treatment among
cases within an institution. 6 More importantly, even if due process
protections were instituted and followed by hospital ethics, without
judicial review or some other external regulatory mechanism,
patients in one hospital have no guarantee of being treated in a
similar fashion as patients at another hospital. 7 This violates our
203. John C. Fletcher, Commentary: Constructiveness Where It Counts, 2 CAMBRIDGE
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 426,432 (1993).
204. Id. (referring to Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal Ct. App.
1986)).
205. 2 Protection of Handicapped Newborns: Hearing Before the United States
Comm'n on Civil Rights 35-36 (Vol. II) (1986) (testimony of Prof. James W. Ellis, School
of Law, University of New Mexico), quoted in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 118 (1989) [hereinafter
MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION].
206. See supra notes 196-97 (discussing lack of due process protections in ethics
committee deliberation).
207. This argument assumes that process protections are not outcome-determinative.
In order for process protections alone to secure inter-institutional equality of treatment,
as judged by substantive outcomes, one would have to show both: (1) that Hospital A and
Hospital B each followed the process protections; and (2) that a given set of process
protections always leads to a defined substantive outcome. For example, one would need
to show that notice and hearing would always lead to the substantive conclusion that a
surrogate may make a decision for an incompetent patient.
Because privilege and immunity frustrate and even destroy the opportunity for
matters initially resolved at the institutional level to be adjudicated at the societal level,
see supra note 45 and accompanying text, the judicial mechanisms for guaranteeing that
like cases will be treated alike cannot come substantively into play.
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fundamental concern for integrity and fairness, a violation that occurs
when people are most vulnerable-when they struggle at death's
door.
F. Conclusion
The geometric increase in hospital ethics committees, together
with more than two decades of experience, permits us to test the
claim that recourse to the courts is vastly more expensive, unwieldy,
and insensitive than decisions made at the institutional level with the
input of hospital ethics committees. As the foregoing comparison
demonstrates, the data trickling in on the performance of hospital
ethics committees reveal a quirky mechanism that cannot sustain its
claim of singular competence in resolving controversies over medical
ethics issues.
In addition to the relative competence of courts and committees
to make end-of-treatment decisions, legislative grants of privilege
and immunity raise other questions that should be addressed: What
advantages does liability offer in the context of medical-ethical
decisionmaking? What policy arguments underpin the grant of
privilege and immunity in related contexts, such as peer review, and
do they apply with equal force to the ethics committee movement?
And, are there certain matters that universally warrant judicial
review, and do the cases with which ethics committees routinely deal
fall within this category? We explore each of these questions in Part
IV.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY STATUTES
We begin our investigation of the implications of grants of
privilege and immunity for medical ethics decisions by looking at the
role liability plays in the healthcare context.
A. Advantages of Liability
Liability affords four principal advantages: it encourages good
decisionmaking, compensates persons who have been wrongfully
harmed, promotes social dialogue on questions of withdrawal and
withholding of treatment, and serves to guide the conduct of third
parties.
1. Liability Promotes Good Decisions
As Professor Capron notes, "[a] certain amount of concern for
legal risk serves as a healthy reminder of the weighty nature of the
[Vol. 76
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decisions one is making."' 8 In addition to underscoring a decision's
gravity, liability serves a critical signaling function by informing
providers how much to invest to avoid mishaps in patient care.'
Privilege and immunity statutes may attenuate or abolish this
deterrence signal2 0 and therefore can be expected to result in poorer
decisionmaking. Poor decisions may arise for another reason as
well. Specifically, providing immunity to professionals who rely on
committee recommendations may compel caretakers to follow
misguided committee recommendations in order to secure
protection.1 2 Furthermore, such immunity departs from society's
208. Capron, supra note 4, at 429; see also Flick, supra note 53, at 1165 ("In every
medical decision, doctors basically gamble that their patient, and if need be a court, will
later find their behavior reasonable. The fundamental uncertainty of the risks is part of
the insurance that decisions are carefully made." (emphasis added)).
209. See William B. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence,
298 NEv ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1283 (1978) (applying Judge Learned Hand's formula:
"litigation ... signals potentially negligent people that it will cost them more to be
careless than to invest in an appropriate level of prevention," so "[d]amages awarded to a
victim induce potentially negligent people to compare the cost of avoiding an injury with
the cost of paying for it"); see also Edward P. Richards & Abraham Silvers, Risk
Management Theory: Reducing Liability in Corporate and Medical Environments, 19
Hous. L. REV. 251, 259 (1982) ("The riskor will best balance its needs against those of
the individual workers, and of society as a whole, when the [victim/worker] receives
enough to be made whole, and the cost of the occurrence of the risk is greater than the
cost of preventing the risk.").
210. The effect of privilege and immunity statutes on the deterrence signal necessarily
depends on the degree of protection provided under the statute. For example, if a state
patterns its immunity statute after the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11101-52 (1994), which affords limited immunity, then the deterrent signal will be
merely attenuated. That is, a deterrence signal will be ient in cases involving violations of
a patient's civil rights, which are not protected by the Act, but may not be sent in cases of
negligence, which fall within the Act's protective shield when certain due process
protections have been provided. See Havighurst, supra note 45, at 1164 ("Although it
may seem desirable to reduce the ability of marginal practitioners to retaliate for
legitimate actions taken against them, the other horn of the legal system's dilemma is the
risk that abusive conduct will be inadequately policed if statutory immunities reduce the
threat of suit."); cf. Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38
AM. U. L. REV. 531, 784 (1989) (arguing in a related context that state laws prohibiting
state contractors from claiming sovereign immunity create "a self-enforcing
accountability system in which the private contractor is required ... to exercise the
necessary degree of care to ensure compliance with the contract," and that "[p]ermitting
the contractor to escape liability through the use of a sovereign immunity defense would
tindermine the goal of accountability"). Stated differently, the strength of the deterrence
signal varies with the "margin of error" created by the particular grant of immunity. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the enlarged realm of acceptability
resulting from a grant of qualified immunity).
211. Cf. Richards & Silvers, supra note 209, at 258-59 (predicting poorer
decisionmaking in situations where compensation is limited by law in order to protect the
risk-taker from financial loss).
212. See Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 324. Professor Flick makes a similar
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refusal to shield primary care physicians who follow a clinical
consultant's advice u
2. Liability Compensates Plaintiffs Who Have Been Wrongfully
Harmed
In addition to deterrence, a second function of litigation is to
compensate plaintiffs who have been harmed by others."'
Unfortunately, the cost of a committee's protective shield is borne by
plaintiffs who may have injuries for which society otherwise would
provide a remedy. As the District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky explained:
[E]ven though some injury might inure to the functioning of
the peer review committee by denying the privilege,
plaintiff's ability to proceed with the litigation is totally
thwarted by granting it. The benefit gained for the correct
disposal of litigation by denying the privilege is
overwhelming, because this court's ability to evaluate
plaintiff's constitutional claims would be totally negated if
the privilege is recognized.215
As Merritt says, "[i]n a legal system that couples responsibility with
liability, immunity for ethics committees would be inappropriate.
21 1
3. Adjudication Promotes Social Dialogue on Significant Issues
Court proceedings generally are marked by open hearings and
public records, although courts often take steps to protect the privacy
of the individuals involved.217  Intra-institutional resolution of
troubling life and death issues by an ethics committee, coupled with
point, arguing that uncertainty about the locus of decisionmaking in medical ethics cases
serves an insurance function, which is undermined by privilege and immunity statutes.
See Flick, supra note 53, at 1165 ("Doctors must be held accountable for their personal
involvement in healing.... Cementing the locus of medical decisionmaking power in any
party abrogates the insurance [created by not knowing who may legally decide] by
allowing the people involved to assign responsibility for their actions to someone else
213. See Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 323 ("[l]mplementing advice from an
ethics committee should provide no more immunity from liability than does following the
recommendation of an expert clinical consultant.").
214. See Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 209, at 1282.
215. Ott v. St. Luke Hosp., 522 F. Supp. 706, 711 (E.D. Ky. 1981). Courts grant
protection only when the "'injury [from] disclosure [is] greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.'" Id. at 710 (quoting ACLU v. Finch, 638
F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981)).
216. Merritt, supra note 5, at 1297.
217. See Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 70; see also supra notes 127-28 and
accompanying text (discussing privacy measures applied by courts).
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immunity for professionals making these decisions, constructs a cloak
of secrecy around end-of-life decisionmaking. Keeping such matters
from public view "may contribute to misunderstanding, frustration
and lack of public confidence" in the decisionmakers."' It also
undermines the "valuable education function [provided by public
access, especially] since such cases are often of great interest to the
public."2 9
Certainly such a result would be ironic. Ethics committees were
intended to provide valuable input and dialogue on ethical issues
surrounding treatment decisions,2 not to be instruments for
shrouding decisions. As Professor Bok points out, secrecy itself
cannot be justified when it "undermine[s] and contradict[s] the very
respect for persons and human bonds that confidentiality was meant
to protect."2' Thus, the strong societal interest in open proceedings
militates against shielding such decisions from public view by
granting protection to committees.
4. Adjudication Is Essential to the "Guidance Function of Law"
Of greater concern than muffled ethical dialogue, intra-
institutional resolution of medical ethics issues threatens to erode an
indispensible function of judicial resolution, the "guidance function
of law":'
Litigation guides third parties. Litigation results in written
opinions that apply necessarily vague positive law to
concrete fact situations. Those opinions are expository-
they refine and elaborate ambiguous norms and "give
operation[al] meaning to principles that would otherwise
remain abstract, rhetorical and elusive." '
218. Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 71 (making this observation about closed court
proceedings).
219. IM; see also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (noting that
evidentiary privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "'the public ... has a
right to every man's evidence"' (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed.
1940))).
220. See Teel, supra note 2, at 8-9.
221. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION
135 (1982).
222. Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1987) (asserting that alternative dispute resolution threatens to
undermine the "guidance function of law").
223. Id. at 20 (quoting Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
585, 592 (1983) (discussing alternate dispute resolution), but changing "operational" to
"operation").
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As ... [alternative dispute resolution] receive[s] a larger
market share of disputes, we can anticipate additional
"disputes" arising as law loses its ability to lead or influence
societal behavior.'
Where resolution of treatment disputes by ethics committees
supplants judicial review, a significant opportunity to articulate
substantive law to govern conduct is lost.
B. Policy Justification for Privilege and Immunity
As Professor Capron notes, "the law [generally] looks with
disfavor on privileges that make unavailable material that might be
helpful to fact-finders in resolving an issue."' Privilege andimmunity are granted, however, when societal interests in having an
activity performed outweigh the costs associated with the loss of
access to judicial redress.' For example, the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act" (the "Act") grants privilegem to "peer review"
records in order to combat the threat of liability. 9 This liability
224. Id. at 23-24.
225. Capron, supra note 4, at 430; see also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950) ("Evidentiary privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public ...
has a right to every man's evidence."' (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2185 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE])).
226. See Ott v. St. Luke Hosp., 522 F. Supp. 706, 710 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (stating that the
"'injury... [from] disclosure ... must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation'" (quoting ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (1981),
which quotes other cases quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 225, § 2285)). In
effect, privilege and immunity statutes are a subsidy of the activity that is granted
protection. See e-g., Merritt, supra note 5, at 1258 ("[I]nterpretation of the protective
statutes to apply to ethics committees would be a means of nurturing their growth."
(emphasis added)).
227. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11101-52 (1994).
228. The Act affords physicians participating in peer review both privilege and
immunity protection. With respect to privilege, the Act provides a very limited form of
privilege. Specifically, § 11137(b)(1) provides for confidentiality only of information
provided to the national repository pursuant to the Act. See Pagano v. Oroville Hosp.,
145 F.R.D. 683, 694 (E.D. Cal. 1993). The Act does not protect reports remaining within
the hospital's peer review file. See Manthe v. VanBolden, 133 F.R.D. 497, 500-01 (N.D.
Tex. 1991). With respect to immunity,
[t]he Act affords hospitals, physicians, and other entities engaged in peer review
protection from monetary damages under all federal and state actions except
those relating to civil rights and due process denials. Immunities are conditioned
upon a series of reasonableness standards, including due process guidelines, that
must be adhered to in the review process.
John D. Blum, Medical Peer Review, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 525,528 (1988).
229. The legislative history to the Act states:
The purpose of this legislation is to improve the quality of medical care by
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unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective
professional review and, therefore, undermines society's ability to
protect the public from harm by incompetent doctors.m
Significantly, the policy arguments underlying the grant of
privilege and immunity to peer review committees simply do not
pertain here. First, there is no evidence that healthcare professionals
encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are
incompetent or who engage in unprofessional behavior. Under this bill,
hospitals and physicians that conduct peer review will be protected from
damages in suits by physicians who lose their hospital privileges, provided the
peer review actions meet the due process and other standards established in the
bill.
H.R. REP. No. 99-5540, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6384; see also
Blum, supra note 228, at 528 ("The most compelling of the factors that led to the
enactment of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act was the continued fear on the
part of organized medicine that those engaged in peer review were legally vulnerable,
regardless of state law protections."); Capron, supra note 4, at 430 ("The rationale for
confidentiality of 'peer review' records ... is [that it is] necessary for candid evaluation of
professionals' performance, which in turn leads to better internal discipline and correction
of problems .... "); Havighurst, supra note 45, at 1160-61 ("One purpose of this act is to
combat 'the threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws ... [which]
unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer
review.'" (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 401-32, 100 Stat. 3784 (1986))); Louise M. Joy,
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: A Proposal for Interpretation of Its
Protection, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 955, 962-63 (1989) ("Congress passed the [Act] to
encourage good faith peer review of physicians practicing in hospitals .... "); Kym
Oltrooge, An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: The Need for States to
Legislate in the Area of Hospital Professional Review Committee Proceedings, 46 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 961, 966-67 (1989) ("Through the protection the [Act] accords to
physicians engaged in professional review actions, Congress attempted to encourage
physicians to participate in the professional review process, and thus maintain a high
standard of quality for medical care in the country."); Jacqueline Oliverio, Note, Hospital
Liability for Defamation of Character During the Peer Review Process: Sticks and Stones
May Break My Bones, but Words May Cost Me My Job, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 739, 754
(1990) ("Congress recognized that [the] goal [of restricting the ability of incompetent
physicians to continue to practice and deliver poor care] could be accomplished through
effective ... peer review, only if the threat of liability for physicians participating in the
... review process was eliminated." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (1994))).
State immunity and privilege statutes grant protection for similar reasons. See
Merritt, supra note 5, at 1257 ("The protective statutes are an acknowledgement that
some special protections [to doctors from damage awards] may be necessary to encourage
the effective use of such committees, which ultimately benefit the public."); Charles
David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional
Survey, 67 N.C. L. REV. 179, 179 (1988) (citing the desire to combat physician
"reluctance to participate in peer review" due to liability concerns and the need "to
enhance the improvement of medical care services" as motivating factors for state
protection of peer review committee work).
230. Admittedly, the threat of liability is significant, as liability consists not only of
damages for defamation, slander, and other common law and statutory causes of action,
but also includes treble damages under federal antitrust law. See AMERICAN MED.
Ass'N, COLLECrIVE NEGOTIATION AND ANTITRUST: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS 4
(1997).
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and laypersons in the community have chosen not to serve on ethics
committees out of concern for their potential liability. Indeed, the
dramatic growth in the number of institutions with such committees
suggests that recalcitrance to serve has not been an issue." Nor is
there evidence that healthcare professionals and others are not using
ethics committees out of fear of liability-in fact, some professionals
may seek ethics committee input precisely to shield themselves from
liability?3 Second, because the creation of an ethics committee or
similar "mechanism" is tied to accreditation and thus to participation
in Medicare2 3 hospitals have sufficient incentive to provide ethics
committee services without an additional societal subsidy in the form
of protective statutes.' Third, immunity undermines an institution's
"incentive to supervise [committee] operations and implement steps
essential to the protection of [patients]." 5 Lastly, given the lack of
policy justifications for immunity, society should provide no more
immunity from liability than it does to primary care physicians who
231. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 39,212 and accompanying text (explaining "safe harbor" effect of
immunity for relying on an ethics committee recommendation).
233. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
234. Arguably, increased risk of liability itself should not merit a subsidy (i.e.,
immunity) in the peer review context, either. That is, peer review is a prerequisite to
hospital accreditation, see Goldberg, supra note 48, at 151, and is a cost that can be
internalized by the hospital through indemnification of the physicians participating in the
peer review process, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION
60 (1990) (explaining indemnification); Charles M. Pisano, Comment, Judicial
Interpretation of Indemnity Clauses, 48 LA. L. REV. 169, 169 (1987) (noting that
indemnity clauses are "used primarily as a means of allocating the risks of a project
among the parties involved"). Denying doctors immunity would force hospitals and
physicians to allocate this risk between themselves, rather than externalizing it to
potential plaintiffs.
In addition to accreditation as a motivating factor, Professor Goldberg identifies the
improvement of patient care and the ensuing decrease in legal liability as further
incentives for hospitals to provide professional peer review without a subsidy. See
Goldberg, supra note 48, at 155. To the extent that ethics committees are perceived to
improve patient care or decrease litigation, hospitals have these additional incentives to
provide committee services without a subsidy.
235. John A. Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV.
484, 535 (1979) (making this observation about immunity for institutional review boards
and advocating instead that institutions carry insurance on board members); see also
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 168 ("Although they should be protected
while acting with due care and diligence, primary decisionmakers and those who review
their actions should not be entirely relieved of legal responsibility."); George J. Annas, In
Re Quinlan: Legal Comfort for Doctors, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1976, at 29, 30-31
(raising a question of how "dangerous and inappropriate is it to diffuse responsibility and




follow the advice of a clinical consultant.2
C. Cases Meriting Mandatory Judicial Review
Significantly, early endorsements of ethics committees as
alternatives to judicial resolution gave committees only a qualified
endorsement.' The President's Commission Report, for example,
concluded that "[r]ecourse to the courts should be reserved for the
occasions when adjudication is clearly required by state law or when
concerned parties have disagreements that they cannot resolve over
matters of substantial import." ' Likewise, the Court Guidelines
prepared by the National Center for State Courts require judicial
involvement in two types of disputes: those involving "unresolvable
disagreements among the primary decision makers, or [those that
raise] serious grounds for believing there is a need for protective
services."m  These characterizations of the role of courts implicitly
contemplate a two-tiered review consisting of the ethics committee
and the court, a structure that is threatened, if not severed, once
ethics committees are granted privilege and immunity.
In two related contexts-sterilization decisions for mentally
retarded children and treatment decisions for severely disabled
infants-the law allows fewer opportunities for ad hoe
decisionmaking rather than permitting greater discretion.m For
236. See Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 323 ("[I]mplementing advice from an
ethics committee should provide no more immunity from liability than does following the
recommendation of an expert clinical consultant.").
237. See Vitiello, supra note 37, at 82.
238. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 6. A number of courts also seem to
have contemplated a two-tier level of review. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("[R]equiring judicial intervention in all cases is
unnecessary and may be unwise." (emphasis added)); Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d
601, 607-08 (Mass. 1982) (listing factors making judicial intervention appropriate in some
cases only); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1976) (stating that "a practice of
applying to a court to confirm such decisions would generally be inappropriate" (emphasis
added)). See also generally Weir & Gostin, supra note 36, at 1848 ("Most courts have
consequently concluded that... judicial intervention [in life-sustaining treatment cases] is
both unnecessary and counterproductive except to protect the lives of nonautonomous
patients who have no surrogate." (emphasis added)). But see In re Conservatorship of
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 n.4 (Minn. 1984) (stating that an affirmation by an ethics
committee of a family's decision to withdraw life support from a patient in persistent
vegetative state would eliminate the need for judicial approval).
239. Hafemeister, supra note 85, at 74.
240. In a third setting-on therapeutic research with incompetents and children-the
vulnerable subject is simply not permitted to participate. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.401-409
(1996) (governing use of children as subjects in clinical research); ROBERT J. LEVINE,
ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 236 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that
federal regulations provide that "we should generally refrain from involving ... [children
1998]
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example, society "protects the mentally disabled person by
establishing a heavy presumption against sterilization and by
requiring a judicial decisionmaker."24' Such procedural safeguards
presume "a conflict of interest between the child and the parent"
seeking sterilization, and "consequently exclude parents from any
role in the decision."22 In addition to the foregoing procedural
safeguards, the law prohibits the decisionmaker-the court-from
considering certain variables when making a sterilization decision.243
A court may not, for instance, consider a parent's interest in
"avoiding the inconvenience associated with menstrual hygiene" or
the state's interest in preventing the financial burden associated with
children of retarded persons.2 "
The law is equally protective of medically fragile infants.25
Sparked by the desperate and ultimately unsuccessful efforts of a
guardian ad litem in Bloomington, Indiana, to secure life-saving
medical treatment against parental wishes for a Down Syndrome
infant known only as Baby Doe," Congress passed the 1984
Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act247
and incompetent individuals] in research that is irrelevant to their conditions or at least as
a class of persons"). This, of course, is even more protective of research subjects than
mandatory judicial review would be. See, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental
Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973) (finding that involuntarily committed
patient cannot consent to experimental "high risk-low benefit" psychosurgery).
241. Scott, supra note 37, at 824.
242. Id. at 818; see In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981) (determining that
incompetents are best protected by independent judicial decisionmaking, not parents'
good faith decision); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1980)
(determining that parents' interests cannot be presumed to be identical to those of the
child).
243. See Scott, supra note 37, at 821-22 & n.51.
244. Id. at 822.
245. See Phoebe A. Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: Compromise and Moral Dilemma, 34
EMORY L.J. 545,584 n.133 (1985) (" 'It is clear that a primary purpose of the regulation is
to require physicians treating newborns to take into account only wholly medical risk-
benefit considerations and to prevent parents from having any influence upon decisions as
to whether further medical treatment is desirable.'" (quoting American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1983))).
246. Born with Down's Syndrome, Baby Doe had a tracheoesophageal fistula, a
surgically correctable failure of the esophagus and trachea to properly connect. Baby
Doe's parents refused to consent to intravenous feeding or to routine corrective surgery
of the blocked digestive tract. The Monroe County (Indiana) Circuit Court and the
Indiana Supreme Court upheld their refusal, and Baby Doe died of starvation six days
later. See In re Infant Doe, No. 608 204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Apr. 1982)
(declaratory judgment), writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe v.
Bloomington Hosp., cert denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); LORI B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL
GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 244 (1987).
247. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984,42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994).
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(the "Amendments"), which regulate nationally all medical
treatment decisions for infants with life-threatening conditions.m
The Amendments set forth a standard of care designed to eliminate
the discriminatory denial of medical treatment to handicapped
infants. 49 Principal enforcement of the Amendments resides with the
Child Protective Services ("CPS") agencies that administer each
state's child abuse and neglect laws.m Every state receiving federal
child abuse grants must establish programs and procedures ("Baby
Doe programs") within its CPS unit to respond to reports of "medical
neglect."" As with sterilization, lawmakers were motivated in part
by parents who were incapable of making rational, infant-focused
judgments during their time of grief for their disabled infant.2 The
result was sharply circumscribed discretion by the decisionmakers
and the insertion of an impartial party-the State CPS unit-into the
decisionmaking process."
Thus, in situations distinguished by a vulnerable patient and a
suspect decisionmaker, ad hoc decisionmaking has been severely
limited. Because many of the end-of-life treatment decisions ethics
committees will be called on to make involve persons largely unable
248. See id. For information on Congress's inspiration, see the remarks of Senator
Hatch in 130 CONG. REC. 27,774 (1984).
249. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106. The Amendments characterize medical neglect as
including the withholding of medically indicated treatment (including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication) from impaired infants with life-threatening
conditions. See id. § 5106(g)(10). Medically indicated treatment is the treatment that, in
the treating physician's "reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective
in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions." Id.
The only exceptions to the requirement that doctors always treat imperiled infants
are when (i) "the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose"; (ii) the treatments
would only prolong dying or would be futile or ineffective in helping the infant survive; or
(iii) when the treatment would be virtually futile in helping the infant survive and would
itself be inhumane. Id.
Even when an infant meets a treatment exception, the infant must always receive
"appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication." Id. Anticipated quality of life is not
a factor to be weighed in a treatment decision. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340, app. at 329 (1996)
("[T]he definition's focus on the potential effectiveness of treatment in ameliorating or
correcting life-threatening conditions makes clear that it does not sanction decisions
based on subjective opinions about the future 'quality of life' of a... disabled person.").
250. See MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 205, at 111.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10)(B).
252. See 130 CONG. REC. 27,774 (remarks of Sen. Hatch); accord id. at 27,319-20
(remarks of Rep. Murphy); id. at 26,110-22 (conference report); iU. at 26,122-23
(Appendix: Joint Explanatory Statement by Principal Sponsors of Compromise
Amendment Regarding Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants).
253. See MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 205, at 111.
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to protect themselves,2 are conducted through procedures that fail to
guarantee the minimal process protections that would alert a family
member or other surrogate to the need to advocate the patient's
interests,25 and because the ethics committee itself may have
conflicting duties to the institution or caregiver, 6 we should reject
any legislative efforts to maximize the authority of committees while
minimizing their accountability.'
V. CONCLUSION
In a field as intellectually new as medical ethics, it is hardly
surprising that the assumptions driving the establishment of ethics
committees are only now beginning to be examined. Nevertheless,
with more than two decades of experience a sufficient track record
now exists to permit a comparative analysis of courts and ethics
committees as competing end-of-life decisionmakers. Parts II and III
suggest, I believe, that the sundry advantages ascribed to ethics
committees by scholars, regulators, and the judiciary are more
illusory than real. Under careful scrutiny, the claim that committees
singularly possess the ethical and technical expertise, responsiveness,
and sensitivity to make treatment decisions is equivocal at best.
The comparative analysis of courts and ethics committees has
implications, too, for the functioning of ethics committees. Plainly,
ethics committees have much to learn from the courts in constructing
procedures to accord due process to patients, who, after all, are the
largest stakeholders in treatment decisions. 8 While committees need
not become "quasi-courts,"" a greater dialogue regarding the
minimal process protections due to patients is warranted.
Finally, the comparison of courts and ethics committees sheds
light on the proper relationship between the two institutions. For the
reasons discussed in Part III-permitting ethics committees to
operate outside the view of the courts-by giving committees
privilege and immunity-may have the unfortunate and unintended
effect of exposing patients to an unregulated, ad hoc decisionmaking
process with little or no guarantee that the patient's interests alone
254. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text discussing institutional biases. At
the very least, few committees have a clearly articulated commitment to the patient's
interests. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
257. See Scofield, supra note 168, at 421.
258. See Wolf, supra note 38, at 283.
259. See id. at 287.
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will be the paramount consideration. Moreover, even if committees
adopted perfect process protections, committees lack the legal
expertise, commitment to precedent, and public accountability to
adjudicate legal rights.'
Beyond the relationship between courts and ethics committees,
there is reason to be concerned about the legislative grants of
privilege and immunity for ethics committee actions emerging in
state legislatures. As I argue in Part IV, this is because privilege and
immunity statutes maximize the authority of ethics committees whileminimizing their accountability.261 Moreover, caution is warranted
anytime a strong policy justification has not been demonstrated.
Here, no wholesale revolt by healthcare providers-such as that
which plagued peer review-has occurred or is even anticipated. 2
This is not to say that privilege and immunity statutes are
without justification. They are justified. Statutes granting privilege
and immunity to ethics committees embody a desire to leave painful
treatment decisions as much as reasonably possible to patients, family
members, and their physicians. On balance, however, these statutes
may abdicate too much. Each of the statutes considered in this
Article insulates ethics committee members and healthcare
professionals who participate in treatment decisions without setting
the terms for such participation. This is ironic given that an
analogous statute, the Health Care Qualified Immunity Act, exacts a
price for the immunity it affords-notice and opportunity to be
heard, representation by an attorney and written determination,
among others.' The failure to place a "due process pricetag" on
privilege and immunity is a critical omission because "the procedures
elaborated in bioethical discourse have themselves been thin,
minimal, and almost exclusively attentive to encounters between lone
individuals such as doctor and patient."2'
In summary, the grant of privilege and immunity to institutional
ethics committees and those who rely on their recommendations
constitutes an unusual transfer of power from the courts to
institutional decisionmakers, for which society has exacted very little
in exchange. Such a transfer of regulatory authority substantially
weakens society's ability to exercise oversight in an area of
260. See id.
261. See Scofield, supra note 168, at 421.
262. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b) (1994).
264. Wolf, supra note 38, at 281.
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fundamental interest to each of us-the time and manner in which we
die. With issues as important as life and death in the balance, we
should hesitate to forfeit to institutional ethics committees the
authority to act as the forum of last resort.
